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  OPINION 
________________                              
 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.    
 Twenty-five years ago, petitioner Terrance Williams 
was tried and convicted of first degree murder for the killing 
of Amos Norwood.  A jury then returned a sentence of death.  
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After two decades of appeals in the Pennsylvania state courts, 
Williams filed a petition for federal habeas review pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The District Court denied the petition but 
certified two questions for our review, to wit: (1) whether trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the penalty 
phase of trial, and (2) whether the Commonwealth exercised 
its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner in 
violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  We 
permitted Williams to expand the certificate of appealability 
to include a question regarding the constitutional propriety of 
the trial court’s accomplice liability instructions.  We 
conclude that each issue is without merit and will affirm. 
I 
 The story of Terrance Williams is reminiscent of Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.  As Dr. Jekyll, Williams was a local 
football star, the quarterback of the Germantown High School 
team that won the Philadelphia Public League championship 
in 1982.  He was presented with the sportsman of the year 
award by the Philadelphia Board of Sports Officials, and he 
was recruited by at least eight different collegiate institutions.  
Nearly all of Williams’ coaches and teachers described him as 
mild-mannered, law-abiding, and honest.  In 1983, Williams 
graduated from Germantown High and matriculated to 
Cheney State College in Philadelphia.  In the estimation of 
one of his instructors, Williams was “highly respected and 
admired by his teacher[s] and all of his classmates.”  He was 
“[n]ot only . . . the star of the school’s football team, but 
[was] also . . . a classmate and student who showed respect 
for others and accepted his popularity with modesty.” 
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 But apparently Terrance Williams had a sinister side.  
In the dead of night on Christmas Eve in 1982, a sixteen-year-
old Williams broke into the Philadelphia residence of Don 
and Hilda Dorfman, aged sixty-nine and sixty-four, 
respectively.  He entered Mrs. Dorfman’s bedroom, wakened 
her by pressing a .22 caliber Winchester rifle to her neck, and 
then pulled a bedsheet over her face.  When Mrs. Dorfman 
attempted to remove the sheet, Williams ordered her to stop 
“or her fucking head would be blown off.”  Williams then 
fired the rifle three times into the wall to show the victims he 
was serious.  Williams and an accomplice ransacked the 
home before making off with cash, jewelry, and the 
Dorfmans’ automobile. 
 It was not long before Williams was apprehended and 
criminally charged for robbing and terrorizing the Dorfmans.  
Although his age placed him under the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court, the Commonwealth moved to certify Williams 
as an adult.  In an attempt to avoid certification, Williams 
produced no fewer than eight witnesses who attested to his 
stable home life, loving parents, and supportive extended 
family.  Every character witness interviewed by the 
Commonwealth believed Williams to be innocent.  Even his 
own attorney would testify years later, “I didn’t feel in my 
own mind of mind[s] and heart of hearts that [Williams] was 
involved in the matter.”  Such was the nature of Williams’ 
dual existence. 
In spite of the efforts to avoid it, Williams was 
certified to stand trial as an adult.  He was released pending 
trial, however, and in January of 1984, he embarked in 
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earnest on a crime spree that would continue for the better 
part of six months.  Williams’ next victim was a fifty-one-
year-old man named Herbert Hamilton, an individual from 
whom Williams had been receiving money in exchange for 
sex.  This relationship, like much else in Williams’ life, was 
kept hidden from most who knew him.  Hamilton apparently 
threatened to publicize the secret, so Williams took action. 
 On January 26, 1984, Williams called on Hamilton at 
his home.  The two eventually retired to the bedroom and, as 
they proceeded toward the bed, Williams withdrew a 
concealed ten-inch butcher knife and attempted to stab 
Hamilton.  Hamilton fought back, wrestled the knife from 
Williams, and stabbed Williams in the chest.  Hamilton then 
dropped the knife and ran into the kitchen to telephone for 
assistance.  Meanwhile, Williams retrieved a nearby baseball 
bat, chased after Hamilton, and beat him with the bat until 
Hamilton was bloody and severely wounded.  Williams then 
recovered the butcher knife and stabbed Hamilton 
approximately twenty times—twice in the head, ten times in 
the back, once in the neck, four times in the chest, and once 
each in the abdomen, arm, and thumb.  Finally, Williams 
drove the butcher knife through the back of Hamilton’s neck 
until it protruded through the other side.  He then doused 
Hamilton’s body with kerosene and unsuccessfully attempted 
to set fire to it.  When police officers later entered the 
apartment, they found Hamilton’s kerosene-soaked body with 
the knife jammed through his neck; on the bathroom mirror, 
the phrase “I loved you” was scrawled in toothpaste.  
Williams was then seventeen. 
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 The Hamilton murder remained unsolved at the time 
that Williams went to trial for the Dorfman robbery in 
February of 1984.  Williams maintained his innocence of the 
robbery throughout trial.  He and his counsel mustered at least 
nine character witnesses who testified that Williams was a 
peaceful, law-abiding, and honest young man.  The jury was 
not persuaded.  They returned a conviction for two counts of 
robbery as felonies of the first degree, one count of burglary, 
one count of simple assault, one count of unauthorized use of 
an automobile, and one count of conspiracy.  Williams was 
nevertheless released pending sentencing.  Tragically, his 
crime spree continued. 
 On June 11, 1984, Williams and a friend, Marc Draper, 
were gambling with several others on a street corner in the 
West Mount Airy neighborhood of Philadelphia.  It was not 
long before both young men lost all of their money.  While 
brainstorming potential means by which to recoup their 
losses, Williams said that he knew a man who lived nearby 
from whom they could extort cash.1  According to Williams, 
 
1  Approximately one month before this date, Williams and Draper 
were arrested for the armed robbery of fifty-three-year-old Robert 
Hill, an acquaintance of the late Herbert Hamilton.  The 
Commonwealth discontinued the prosecution for this offense after 
Williams was sentenced to death for the Norwood killing.  
Evidence of the crime was not presented to the Norwood jury 
during the trial’s penalty phase and was not offered by the 
Commonwealth during the PCRA proceeding.  Given these 
circumstances, we have not considered the facts relating to this 
offense for purposes of our present inquiry. 
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this individual—fifty-six-year-old Amos Norwood—was a 
closeted homosexual.  With a plan that they would threaten to 
reveal Norwood’s secret to his wife, Draper and Williams set 
off for Norwood’s apartment. 
 When they arrived at Norwood’s residence, Williams 
told Draper to wait outside.  Williams emerged with $10 in 
cash approximately twenty minutes later.  Williams and 
Draper were apparently satisfied with this amount because 
they returned to the street corner to resume gambling.  A 
short time later, Norwood drove by the corner in his blue 
Chrysler LeBaron.  When he spotted the vehicle, Williams 
said, “There goes my uncle,” flagged down the car, and 
entered via the passenger side door.  Norwood then drove 
away. 
 The blue LeBaron returned to the intersection several 
minutes later, whereupon Williams exited the vehicle, 
approached Draper, and said quietly, “Play it off like you 
going home, like you want a ride home, and we gonna take 
some money.”  Draper understood Williams to be proposing a 
robbery.  The two then got inside Norwood’s automobile and 
Draper began to provide false directions to his “home.”  In 
reality, Draper’s directions led Norwood to a secluded area 
adjacent to the Ivy Hill Cemetery.  Once there, Draper 
reached over the backseat, grabbed Norwood from behind and 
ordered him “to be quiet and get out of the car.”  Norwood 
stopped the vehicle and complied. 
 Williams and Draper then led Norwood into the 
cemetery and ordered him to lie facedown near a tombstone.  
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A quick search of Norwood’s person revealed $20 hidden in 
his sock.  At this point, Norwood began to plead for his life.  
The two assailants responded by removing Norwood’s 
clothing and tying him up; Norwood’s hands were bound 
behind his back with his shirt, his legs were bound together 
with his pants, and his socks were forcefully jammed into his 
mouth.  Once Norwood was bound, Williams said to Draper, 
“Wait, I’m going to the car.  We’re getting ready to do 
something.”  And he walked off. 
 Williams returned with a tire iron and a socket wrench, 
the latter of which he gave to Draper.  Draper, seemingly 
having second thoughts, urged Williams to leave.  Williams 
replied, “I know what I’m doin, I know what I’m doin.  Don’t 
worry about it, I know what I’m doin.”  He then began 
battering Norwood’s head with the tire iron.  When he noticed 
that Draper was frozen in place, Williams said, “Man, you 
with me[?]  We got to do this together.”  Draper then sprung 
into action himself, striking Norwood repeatedly with the 
socket wrench.  This violent scene continued until Norwood 
lay motionless and dead.  Draper later recalled that there was 
blood everywhere.  On the day of his second murder, 
Williams was four months past his eighteenth birthday. 
Williams and Draper soon parted ways.  Draper 
reported to work, while Williams took Norwood’s automobile 
downtown to meet a friend, Ronald Rucker.  Rucker noticed 
that Williams was “hyper” and asked him if everything was 
okay.  Williams then disclosed that he had just “offed a guy” 
named Amos.  Although Rucker initially did not believe his 
friend, he began to reconsider after observing blood stains on 
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Williams’ shoes.  Later that night, Williams told Rucker he 
was “going to get some gas from a gas station to go back to 
the scene of the crime.”  Rucker surmised that Williams 
intended to burn Norwood’s body.  That is precisely what 
Williams did. 
 Williams and Draper were eventually undone by their 
use of a credit card and telephone calling card—both in 
Norwood’s name—that they had taken from Norwood’s 
automobile.  Philadelphia police traced use of the calling card 
back to Rucker; upon questioning, he implicated Williams 
and Draper.  When his interview with law enforcement 
concluded, Rucker informed Williams that he had provided 
police with Williams’ last name.  Panicked, Williams boarded 
a bus bound for San Francisco.  In the meantime, Draper was 
arrested and promptly confessed.  He also told police about 
the Herbert Hamilton killing.  With this information, officers 
proceeded to obtain a warrant for Williams’ arrest. 
 Approximately halfway through his cross-country bus 
ride, Williams telephoned his girlfriend, Marlene Rogers.  
Rogers informed him about the outstanding arrest warrant, 
and urged her boyfriend to return to Philadelphia so that he 
could defend the charges against him.  Her entreaty was 
apparently convincing, for Williams promptly boarded an 
airplane and returned east.  On July 23, 1984, he arranged to 
be arrested in the Philadelphia office of his attorney, Ronald 
White.  Williams’ mother notified a reporter from the Daily 
News that her son would surrender to authorities in White’s 
office.  Before his arrest, Williams told the newspaper, “I 
wanted to come back and clear my name.”  The reporter 
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snapped photographs as Williams was led out of White’s 
office in handcuffs. 
 Two days later, Williams was sentenced to twelve-
and-a-half to twenty years’ imprisonment for his participation 
in the Dorfman robbery.  In February 1985, he was tried and 
convicted of third degree murder for the Hamilton killing.  
Finally, a jury trial for the Norwood murder commenced in 
January of 1986 in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.  
Draper testified for the Commonwealth and detailed the 
manner in which he and Williams guided Norwood to the Ivy 
Hill Cemetery, robbed and bound him, and then beat him to 
death.  Williams later took the stand in his own defense and 
pinned the murder on Draper and another individual, Michael 
Hopkins.  The jury rejected Williams’ testimony and returned 
a conviction for first degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. 
The trial’s penalty phase began immediately after the 
jury announced its verdict.2  The Commonwealth introduced 
evidence that Williams was recently convicted of armed 
robbery and third degree murder.  Williams, in turn, presented 
three witnesses in mitigation.  His mother, Patricia Kemp, 
described her son’s athletic success and testified that he was 
well-liked and respected by those who knew him.  She also 
 
2  At the time of Williams’ trial and conviction, Pennsylvania law 
required that “[a]fter a verdict of murder of the first degree is 
recorded and before the jury is discharged, the court shall conduct 
a separate sentencing hearing in which the jury shall determine 
whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life 
imprisonment.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(a)(1). 
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characterized Williams’ stepfather as a verbally abusive 
alcoholic who routinely berated her son and once pushed him 
down a flight of stairs.  Ms. Kemp denied participating in any 
abuse herself.  Marlene Rogers, Williams’ girlfriend and the 
mother of his thirteen-month-old child, said that Williams 
was a “very supportive father” and had never been violent 
towards her or anyone she knew.  The defendant’s last 
mitigation witness added little, rambling that “we all have 
sinned and come short of the glory of God . . . . We all have 
committed murder.  We all have stolen some things that we 
should not have done.  We all have committed adultery.  I 
don’t believe you should kill another person.  Blood will be 
on your hands.” 
 After witness testimony was complete, Williams’ trial 
counsel, Nicholas Panarella, closed by emphasizing the 
defendant’s youth at the time of the murder and by urging the 
jury to find that age was a mitigating factor in the offense.  
He then asked that they consider any residual doubt 
remaining from the guilt phase and argued that a sentence of 
life imprisonment was sufficiently severe, for it would subject 
Williams to “all of the brutalities that are associated with 
prison life.”  Panarella concluded by pleading for mercy.  His 
plea was rejected.  The jury found two aggravating 
circumstances, namely (1) that the murder occurred during 
commission of a felony (robbery), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
9711(d)(6), and (2) that Williams had a significant history of 
felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence, 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(9).  The jury found that there were 
no mitigating circumstances present in the case.  They 
returned a sentence of death. 
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II 
 Williams has been contesting the jury’s death sentence 
almost from the moment it was announced on February 4, 
1986.  Shortly after trial, he dismissed Panarella and obtained 
new counsel, Norris Gelman.  Gelman promptly filed a 
motion for a new trial on ineffective assistance of counsel 
grounds.  On April 24 and July 1, 1987, the trial court held 
hearings on the motion during which Panarella was called to 
the stand to provide testimony on his mitigation strategy.  He 
indicated that his central focus was Williams’ youth, which 
he believed to be the mitigating factor most applicable under 
§ 9711 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.  Panarella 
also explained that Williams provided him little, if any, 
assistance, which frustrated efforts to present a strong cadre 
of character witnesses on the defendant’s behalf.  Finally, 
when asked why he did not proffer evidence that Williams 
was psychologically damaged, Panarella was frank:  
My own personal observations of Mr. Williams 
were and are that he is a very cold, calculating 
person.  I did not discern any area where there 
was any doubt in my mind or that would have 
caused me to consider the fact that he was either 
not qualified or incapable of standing trial or 
facing punishment. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on July 1, 1987, Williams’ 
motion for a new trial was denied.  The trial court thereafter 
sentenced him to death on the first degree murder conviction. 
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 On February 8, 1990, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment and conviction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Williams (Williams I), 570 A.2d 75 (Pa. 
1990).  Williams did not petition for certiorari in the United 
States Supreme Court.  He did, however, timely file a pro se 
petition for relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction 
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq.3  New 
counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition raising 
twenty-three separate claims for relief.4  Among them, 
Williams argued that the Commonwealth exercised its 
peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, in 
violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and that 
Panarella provided constitutionally ineffective assistance 
during the trial’s penalty phase.  The Court of Common Pleas 
denied relief on October 20, 1998, and on December 22, 
2004, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed over the 
dissent of two justices.5  See Commonwealth v. Williams 
 
3  Williams’ PCRA petition was timely because he filed it before 
the post-conviction statute was amended to require petitioners to 
seek collateral relief within one year of the date that judgment 
becomes final.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b); see also Lewis v. 
Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 97 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
4  For a comprehensive compilation, see the May 8, 2007 order 
filed by the District Court.  Williams v. Beard, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 41310, at *7–10 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2007). 
 
5  Williams filed a second PCRA petition on February 18, 2005.  
The Common Pleas Court dismissed the petition as untimely under 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed on September 27, 2006. 
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turn. 
III 
                                                
(Williams II), 863 A.2d 505 (Pa. 2004). 
 In July of 2005, Williams filed a timely petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  He therein raised a total 
of twenty-one claims, most of them not pertinent to the 
instant appeal.  The District Court denied the petition in a 
thorough memorandum dated May 8, 2007, but granted 
Williams a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) 
whether the Commonwealth exercised its peremptory strikes 
in a racially discriminatory manner, and (2) whether trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the penalty 
phase.  We later granted Williams’ motion to expand the 
certificate of appealability, permitting him to contest the 
constitutionality of the trial court’s jury instructions on 
accomplice liability.6  We address each of these issues in 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
 
6  We also granted Williams’ motion to certify a fourth issue for 
review, namely: whether the aggravating circumstance set forth at 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(6) was improperly applied by the jury 
in violation of due process and the Eighth Amendment.  Williams 
later abandoned this issue, stating, “Since the jury found another 
valid aggravating circumstance and no mitigating factors, 
Petitioner does not believe he can show prejudice resulting from 
this error and will not pursue this claim.”  Appellant Br. at 1 n.1.  
Accordingly, we do not address this contention. 
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(quoting 
Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
2241 and 2254.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253.  The District Court did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing in this case, instead limiting itself to the 
evidence contained in the state court record.  Our review of 
the District Court’s legal conclusions is therefore plenary, and 
we evaluate “‘the state courts’ determinations under the same 
standard that the District Court was required to apply.’”  
Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009) 
 Review of the instant petition is governed by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.  Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 
F.3d 246, 254 (3d Cir. 2004) (petitions filed after April 1996 
subject to AEDPA standards).  For inmates such as Williams, 
who are incarcerated by the state, AEDPA prohibits federal 
court relief on claims which have not been presented to the 
state’s tribunals.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).  If a petitioner’s 
claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, habeas 
relief is precluded unless the state court’s decision was (1) 
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  § 2254(d).  
Thus, AEDPA erects “‘a substantially higher threshold’ for 
obtaining relief than de novo review.”  Renico v. Lett, --- U.S. 
---, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quoting Schriro v. 
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)).  “[A] federal habeas 
court may not issue the writ simply because that court 
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-
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n was unreasonable, Renico, --- U.S. --
-, 130 S. Ct. at 1862. 
evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.”7  Miller-El 
court decision applied clearly established federal law 
erroneously or incorrectly,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
411 (2000); relief instead requires a determination that the 
state court’s applicatio
 In addition, AEDPA endows a state tribunal’s findings 
of fact with a “presumption of correctness,” and this 
presumption extends “to the factual determinations of state 
trial and appellate courts.”  Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 
196 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) and 
Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1996)).  To 
overcome the presumption, a habeas petitioner must proffer 
clear and convincing evidence to show that a factual 
determination is “objectively unreasonable in light of the 
                                                 
7  Section 2254(e)(1) refers to a state court’s specific factual 
determinations—in other words, the discrete findings that “are 
subsidiary to the ultimate decision.”  Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 
F.3d 210, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).  These findings may be set aside 
only upon a showing that there is clear and convincing evidence to 
the contrary.  A challenge to the state courts’ ultimate factual 
determination proceeds under § 2254(d)(2).  That section, which 
refers to “an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State Court proceeding,” requires a 
federal habeas court to “assess whether the state court’s 
determination was reasonable or unreasonable” given the totality 
of the evidence adduced in the state tribunal.  Lambert, 387 F.3d at 
235.  A challenge to the state court’s individual findings of fact 
under § 2254(e)(1) may be based “wholly or in part on evidence 
outside the state trial record.”  Id.  However, “even if a state 
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v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).  Our review proceeds 
under this AEDPA rubric. 
A Batson Claim 
 Williams, who is an African American male, argues 
that the Commonwealth’s use of peremptory challenges 
during jury selection violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79 (1986).  In Batson, the Supreme Court held that deliberate 
or purposeful exclusion of African Americans from jury 
service violates the Equal Protection Clause.  Batson, 476 
U.S. at 84.  The decision set forth a three-step procedure for 
evaluating claims of discrimination in the jury selection 
process: 
First, a defendant must make a prima facie 
showing that a peremptory challenge has been 
exercised on the basis of race.  Second, if that 
showing has been made, the prosecution must 
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in 
question.  Third, in light of the parties’ 
submissions, the trial court must determine 
whether the defendant has shown purposeful 
discrimination. 
                                                                                                             
court’s individual factual determinations are overturned, what 
factual findings remain to support the state court decision must still 
be weighed under the overarching standard of section 2254(d)(2).”  
Id. at 235–36. 
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 thus begin our 
review of Williams’ Batson claim by reconstructing the voir 
s first two strikes 
on African American venirepersons; this prompted Panarella 
to obje
ere to ask the 
Commonwealth on what basis they exercised 
hallenges.  I believe that this 
may be only the first challenge that I have 
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 328–29 (discussing three-step inquiry 
and citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98).  Batson was handed 
down in April 1986—four months after the jury was 
empaneled to hear the Norwood murder trial.  However, 
because Williams’ conviction was pending on direct review at 
the time Batson was decided, its holding applies retroactively 
to jury selection in the Norwood case.  See Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).  We
dire, which commenced on January 6, 1986. 
 Each party was afforded a total of twenty peremptory 
challenges.  The Commonwealth exercised it
ct and led to the following exchange: 
MR. PANARELLA:  Your Honor, I’m not sure 
of the case but there was a recent case which 
dealt with an attempt by the State or the 
Commonwealth to systematically exclude 
blacks from the jury.  I think it would be 
appropriate if we w
the peremptory challenge. 
THE COURT:  Anything you want to say? 
[PROSECUTOR]:  No, your Honor, and I 
might point out that the defense has exercised 
its peremptory c
 19 
 
owever, I will ask Miss Foulkes if 
the peremptory challenges are being based on 
ECUTOR]:  Absolutely not, your Honor.  
I might suggest they are not being based on race 
THE COURT:  Thank you very much.  The 
“I have 
raised an objection with respect to how she has raised her 
exercised at all. 
THE COURT:  So far, the defense has 
challenged peremptorily two persons who, 
incidentally, both of whom were white.  The 
Commonwealth has peremptorily challenged 
two persons who, incidentally, both of whom 
are black.  The Court is very cognizant of the 
law in that area; however, at this point, I can see 
nothing that suggests that the peremptory 
challenges are being based on race alone.  I’m 
not going to ask the Commonwealth to set forth 
the reason; h
race alone? 
[PROS
at all. 
record will reflect your objection. 
The Commonwealth then used its next two peremptory 
challenges to strike two more African American members of 
the venire.  Panarella objected a second time, stating, 
 20 
 
peremp
 what other determinations you 
choose to make which you believe to be right 
In response, the prosecutor, Andrea Foulkes, simply noted 
excuse.  
tory challenges.”8  The trial judge then stated, 
With respect to your objection concerning the 
use of peremptory challenges, that is your right 
and if there’s anything you want to say further 
regarding that, you are free to say it. . . . You 
made your position plain the last time, Miss 
Foulkes, and I continue to accept that you are 
challenging people without respect to race but 
with respect to
under the law. 
that “the record will speak for itself.” 
 The Commonwealth thereafter struck ten additional 
African American venirepersons.  Panarella did not object to 
the exercise of any of these strikes.  In sum, fourteen of the 
sixteen peremptory challenges exercised by the prosecutor 
were utilized to dismiss African Americans.  She struck 
fourteen of the nineteen African American venire members 
that she had the opportunity to peremptorily dismiss.  In 
contrast, Foulkes struck only two of the twenty-one white 
individuals she had the opportunity to peremptorily 
                                                 
8 The Commonwealth argues that Panarella’s statement does not 
constitute an objection.  This assertion is belied by the record.  The 
trial judge himself characterized the statement as an “objection,” 
and certainly responded in a manner indicating that he was ruling 
on a formal objection. 
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he prosecutor] 
provide race neutral reasons for her challenges,” and that 
pella
ld an evidentiary hearing on the issue. 
 ded 
William taken 
during r the 
record
 
jury, the 12 principal jurors, 
was 7 white and 5 black.  Total perempts—
                                                
At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial court empaneled a jury 
composed of five black jurors and seven white jurors. 
 Williams did not advance a Batson challenge on direct 
appeal.  He did, however, raise the issue in his PCRA 
petition.  Williams’ petition also asserted that his trial counsel 
was ineffective “for failing to insist that [t
ap te counsel was ineffective for neglecting to raise a 
Batson claim on direct appeal.  In April 1998, twelve years 
after jury selection in the Norwood murder trial, the PCRA 
court he
At the outset of the hearing, the PCRA court provi
s with several pages of notes that the judge had 
 voir dire.9  The court summarized its notes fo
: 
There were 111 prospective jurors called. 
That’s [the] total composition of the jury panel 
from which the jury was selected.  Of those 
111, 68 were white and 43 were black.  The 
composition of the 
 
9  Williams was tried in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas 
before the Honorable David N. Savitt, Jr.  Pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 9545, jurisdiction over a PCRA proceeding lies in the 
Common Pleas court.  Accordingly, Judge Savitt also presided 
over Williams’ petition for collateral relief. 
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challenge.  She used this summary to aid her PCRA 
stimo
o that he could discover whether Foulkes recorded 
the race of each potential juror, and to check the veracity of 
her t the 
neither side used the full quota of 20 perempts.  
The total perempts were 35, 18 of which were 
applied to white prospective jurors, 17 to black 
prospective jurors. 
The Commonwealth utilized 16 peremptory 
challenges, 2 of white jurors, 14 of black jurors.  
The defense used 19 peremptory challenges, 16 
of white jurors, 3 of black jurors. 
Williams then called Foulkes to the stand.  She provided an 
explanation for each of her peremptory challenges and stated 
that she “categorically did not” strike any venireperson on the 
basis of race.  Foulkes also testified that in order to prepare 
for the PCRA hearing, she reviewed a transcript of voir dire 
as well as the handwritten notes that she took during jury 
selection.  After reviewing both the transcript and the notes, 
Foulkes created a one-page document that summarized, to the 
best of her recollection, the rationale behind each peremptory
te ny, though she acknowledged that she was unable to 
remember each of her reasons for exercising a strike.  
Williams’ counsel was provided a copy of the one-page 
summary and used it to question Foulkes during the hearing. 
 In addition, Williams moved for production of the 
handwritten notes that Foulkes took contemporaneous with 
voir dire.  He argued that production of the notes was 
necessary s
estimony.  The PCRA court reviewed 
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contem enied 
William notes 
contain
s called by the defense and testified 
fully and completely using, in a very limited 
                                                
poraneous notes in camera and thereafter d
s’ request.  According to the court, the 
ed  
nothing [] that needs to be supplied to defense 
counsel or to be made part of the record.  Miss 
Foulkes wa
way, the notes that are the subject of this 
inquiry to refresh her recollection.  Under the 
circumstances, . . . no further discovery is 
warranted. 
 In a written order dated January 13, 1999, the PCRA 
court denied Williams’ Batson challenge, concluding that he 
had failed to make out a prima facie case at step one of 
Batson’s three-step analytical framework.10  Williams 
appealed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the 
Batson claim was waived because it was not presented on 
direct appeal.  It then turned to the derivative ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.  To assess these claims, the 
court looked to the underlying Batson challenge.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, as set forth in Commonwealth v. Uderra, 
862 A.2d 74 (Pa. 2004), the failure to raise a Batson objection 
during voir dire deprives a petitioner of Batson’s three-step 
burden-shifting procedure.  A petitioner so deprived must 
instead shoulder the burden to prove actual, purposeful 
 
10  The PCRA court did not address Williams’ derivative claims of 
trial and appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness. 
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, concluding that he had “fail[ed] to 
demonstrate exceptional circumstances existed which 
Batson claim and the derivative claims of ineffective 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Williams’ “trial 
counsel did not raise a Batson objection during voir dire,” and 
thus the Uderra rule applied.  Williams II, 863 A.2d at 514.  It 
then determined that Williams had not marshaled evidence 
sufficient to prove actual, purposeful discrimination.  Id. at 
515.  In other words, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
that the underlying Batson claim was without merit.  Because 
the Batson claim was meritless, Williams’ trial and appellate 
counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to raise it.  
Finally, the court rejected Williams’ contention that he was 
entitled to production of Foulkes’ contemporaneous 
handwritten notes
required production of the actual notes.”  Id. at 515 n.10 
(citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(d)(2) (“No discovery, at any 
stage of proceedings under this subchapter, shall be permitted 
except upon leave of court with a showing of exceptional 
circumstances.”)). 
 Williams’ federal habeas petition presented both his 
assistance of counsel.  He also requested an evidentiary 
hearing and an opportunity to discover Foulkes’ handwritten 
notes.  The District Court denied Williams’ request for 
discovery, addressed the Batson claim on its merits,11 and 
                                                 
11  The District Court correctly held that Williams did not 
procedurally default his Batson claim by failing to raise it on direct 
appeal.  See Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“As we have held on numerous occasions, in capital cases where 
the waiver occurred before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made 
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ourt held that Williams’ 
Batson challenge was without merit. 
                                                                                                            
held that the PCRA court unreasonably applied clearly 
established federal law when it concluded that Williams had 
not made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination at 
step one of the Batson analysis.  Even so, the District Court 
found that the Commonwealth proffered clear and reasonably 
specific race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes and 
that, in the face of such a proffer, Williams was unable to 
show purposeful discrimination in the Commonwealth’s 
selection of jurors.  Therefore, the C
 Williams contends that the District Court erred in three 
respects: first, it should have compelled production of the 
handwritten notes; second, it should have conducted an 
evidentiary hearing to allow Williams to question Foulkes 
regarding the content of the notes; and third, it should have 
concluded that the Commonwealth’s use of peremptory 
challenges contravened Batson.  The Commonwealth offers 
rejoinders to each of these arguments and identifies two 
alleged errors of its own.  Specifically, the Commonwealth 
claims that (1) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application 
of the rule announced in Commonwealth v. Uderra, 862 A.2d 
74 (Pa. 2004), is reasonable and governs the analysis of 
Williams’ Batson challenge; and (2) even if the Uderra rule 
does not apply, the PCRA court reasonably concluded that 
Williams failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful 
 
it clear that it would no longer apply the relaxed waiver rule, the 
waiver rule was not ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ 
and, therefore, the waiver is not an adequate basis for a finding of 
procedural default.”).  The Commonwealth does not contest this 
aspect of the District Court’s opinion. 
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nation.12  We address each of these competing claims 
below. 
1 Production of Prosecutor’s Notes & 
Evidentiar  Hearing 
discrimi
y
 
 Williams argues that the PCRA court denied him a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate his Batson claim when it 
                                                 
12  The Commonwealth also claims that under our recent decision 
in Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2008), Williams may 
only challenge the prosecutor’s second peremptory strike, for this 
is the only strike to which he contemporaneously objected.  In 
Abu-Jamal, we held that a timely, contemporaneous objection is 
required in order to preserve a Batson issue for appeal.  520 F.3d at 
284.  We explained that the failure to object during voir dire 
prevents the trial court from fulfilling responsibilities that are 
critical to the Batson framework, namely: evaluating the 
prosecutor’s credibility and demeanor and, if necessary, promptly 
remedying defects in the selection process.  See id. at 281–82.  In 
this case, there is no question that Williams raised an objection 
after the Commonwealth exercised its second peremptory strike.  
Williams then objected again following the prosecutor’s fourth 
peremptory challenge.  By raising two objections during jury 
selection, Williams satisfied the contemporaneous objection 
requirement.  See Lewis, 581 F.3d at 102 (requiring “a timely 
objection” to preserve a Batson claim under Abu-Jamal (emphasis 
added)).  He unequivocally put the trial court on notice of his equal 
protection challenge and he allowed the court to inquire as 
necessary.  The court had an opportunity to evaluate the prosecutor 
and, if it deemed appropriate, to investigate the reasons underlying 
the strikes.  This is all that Abu-Jamal requires.  The 
Commonwealth’s arguments to the contrary are without merit. 
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 so that he may 
pursue his § 2254 claims in federal court.  Williams 
 at 
300; see also Lave v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 372, 380 (5th Cir. 
rejected his request to produce Foulkes’ contemporaneous 
voir dire notes.  He does not ask us to review the state court’s 
evidentiary decision, but instead argues that under federal 
law, he is entitled to production of the notes
petitioned the District Court for production of the notes and 
for an evidentiary hearing in which to probe the rationale 
underlying the Commonwealth’s exercise of peremptory 
challenges.  The District Court denied both requests.  
Williams claims that this ruling was in error. 
 Discovery in § 2254 litigation proceeds according to 
Rule 6 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.  That provision 
states, “A judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to 
conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and may limit the extent of discovery.”  Accordingly, habeas 
petitioners are entitled to discovery only upon a showing of 
“good cause,” and even then, the scope of discovery is subject 
to a district court’s sound discretion.  See Harris v. Nelson, 
394 U.S. 286, 299–300 (1969) (discussing pre-Rule 6 
discovery standard); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 
(1997) (explaining that Rule 6 was meant to be consistent 
with Harris); see also Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1493 
(3d Cir. 1994) (“A district court sitting in a habeas case 
retains the discretion to permit additional discovery if the 
petitioner presents ‘good cause’ to do so.”).  A habeas 
petitioner may satisfy the “good cause” standard by setting 
forth specific factual allegations which, if fully developed, 
would entitle him or her to the writ.  See Harris, 394 U.S.
2005).  The burden rests upon the petitioner to demonstrate 
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 382, 403 (4th Cir. 2004); Newton v. Kemna, 354 
F.3d 776, 783 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Bracy, 520 U.S. at 
oulkes, summarizing her 
concerns with each of the venire members that she struck; and 
ough Williams was not 
supplied with Foulkes’ handwritten voir dire notes, he was 
expres  that 
which 
 ntent 
that the sought-after information is pertinent and that there is 
good cause for its production.  R. 6(b) R. Gov. § 2254 Cases; 
Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 974 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 814–15 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 We review the District Court’s denial of a discovery 
request for abuse of discretion.  Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 
978, 997 (9th Cir. 2010); Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50, 60 (1st 
Cir. 2007); Williams, 380 F.3d at 974; United States v. Roane, 
378 F.3d
909.  A district court abuses its discretion when discovery is 
“‘essential for the habeas petitioner to develop fully his 
underlying claim.’”  Mahoney, 611 F.3d at 997 (quoting 
Dung The Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 
2005)). 
 The PCRA court afforded Williams considerable 
latitude to develop the facts underlying his Batson challenge 
during collateral proceedings.  Williams was granted a six-
day evidentiary hearing; he called Foulkes to the stand and 
conducted an extensive examination; he was provided with a 
one-page document, created by F
he was given several pages of the trial court’s voir dire-
related notes.  What is more, alth
sly permitted to question the prosecutor regarding
she recorded in those notes. 
On direct examination, Foulkes described the co
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of her 
that they said.  It’s that 
simple.  If there was something overtly 
he “mostly wrote down things 
like location, age, whether they had children, where they 
worked
the record; in other words, the 
information was readily available for Williams to use as he 
mount
orded 
each p t she 
genera
black and white jurors in the couple of 
handwritten notes as follows: 
I took notes with respect to each individual 
prospective venire person as they came up and 
as they spoke.  My process of thinking requires 
contemporaneously writing.  It’s just something 
that I do.  And what I wrote down were 
principally what it was 
extraordinary about the witness that I observed, 
I would also write that down, but not always, 
and that was not always necessary, and 
whatever I didn’t write down would also be 
reflected on the record. 
Foulkes later explained that s
, the things that we ask in voir dire routinely.”  Thus, 
according to Foulkes, much of what she recorded in her notes 
was also reflected in 
ed his collateral attack. 
When Williams queried whether Foulkes rec
rospective juror’s race, the prosecutor replied tha
lly did not, stating 
No, I don’t believe I did.  I would record both 
occasions that I recorded race at all.  I recorded 
them more or less equally for black and white 
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fic concerns 
regarding the veracity of those representations.  Yet, the court 
needs to be supplied to defense counsel or to be made part of 
jurors, and I don’t think I did it beyond the first 
few prospective jurors, and then I just stopped 
doing it.  It wasn’t necessary, certainly, to do it. 
Of course, the PCRA judge heard Foulkes’ testimony and her 
description of the notes’ contents.  When he later examined 
the notes in camera, he was aware of the prosecutor’s 
representations, as well as Williams’ speci
stated on the record that it found “nothing [in the notes] that 
the record.”  Furthermore, the court characterized Foulkes’ 
testimony regarding her notes as “full” and “complete,” and 
ruled that “no further discovery is warranted.”13 
                                                 
13  Prior to the PCRA court’s in camera review, Williams’ counsel 
made several oral requests for production of the notes.  His 
arguments in favor of production were clear and well stated.  
Foremost, he was concerned that Foulkes was not disclosing the 
complete contents of the notes.  Thus, counsel argued, “I should 
not be in a position, with all due respect to the witness and her high 
office, of taking her word for it.  She’s got notes; I should be 
allowed to look at her notes.  She’s just like any other witness.  
And I can’t—as my client’s attorney, I’m charged with a 
responsibility to not take her word for it.  My job is to get the notes 
so I can check the veracity of her answers, and that’s why I’ve 
sought the notes.”  Counsel was also interested in evidence of 
Foulkes’ thought process.  He argued, “She may have a pattern of 
what she recorded that could reflect what she thought at the time 
she exercised her strikes.”  Both of these contentions were 
roffered directly prior to the PCRA court’s in camera review.  p
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ails 
to set forth, in a colorable manner, exactly what he lacks. 
 Williams now essentially asks that we disbelieve the 
PCRA court, yet he presents us with no fact-based reason to 
do so.  Instead, he argues that the notes are imperative so that 
he may inquire into the prosecutor’s state of mind.  His 
argument proceeds as if he has never had such an opportunity.  
But Williams has subjected Foulkes to cross examination on 
precisely this point.  He has also discovered a summary 
compilation of the motives underlying her strikes.  The PCRA 
judge compared this summary, in camera, to Foulkes’ raw 
notes, and pronounced it a “full” and “complete” disclosure.  
Thus, Williams has already been afforded significant 
opportunity to discover the prosecutor’s state of mind; he f
 Ultimately, Williams’ request amounts to an entreaty 
to engage in a fishing expedition.  The law is clear, however, 
that such speculative discovery requests should be rejected.  
See Murphy, 205 F.3d at 814 (“Simply put, Rule 6 does not 
authorize fishing expeditions.”); see also Mayberry v. 
Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1987).  The District 
Court reviewed the record of collateral proceedings, remarked 
upon the significance of both the PCRA court’s in camera 
review and subsequent characterization of the notes, and ruled 
that Williams “received all the information he is 
constitutionally entitled to in order to proceed with his Batson 
                                                                                                             
When the PCRA court subsequently described the testimony as 
“full” and “complete,” it was implicitly indicating that Foulkes 
testified truthfully about the notes’ contents and that they 
contained no relevant, undisclosed indicator of her subjective 
motivation. 
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rict court abuses its discretion when it 
denies discovery that is essential to development of the 
                                                
claim.”  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
reaching this conclusion.14  See Mahoney, 611 F.3d at 997 
(stating that a dist
petitioner’s claim). 
 In addition, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying Williams’ motion for an evidentiary 
hearing.  District courts have discretion to grant such hearings 
under § 2254(e)(2).  Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 393 
(3d Cir. 2010); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 287 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  We have set forth two considerations to guide a 
district court when confronted with such requests: first, it 
“should determine whether the petition presents a prima facie 
showing which, if proven, would enable the petitioner to 
prevail on the merits of the asserted claim,” and second, even 
 
14  The District Court incorrectly applied 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to 
 an overly stringent 
urden, one that a petitioner is unlikely to meet.  The District 
Williams’ request for production, holding that the PCRA court’s 
“refusal to turn over the notes was not contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,” and 
that the decision was “not based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court 
proceedings.”  Section 2254(d) applies only to a “substantive 
request for habeas relief” and not a discovery request.  Fahy v. 
Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2008).  Application of § 2254(d) 
to a habeas discovery request surely imposes
b
Court’s error is not fatal, however, for we exercise plenary review 
over the Court’s legal conclusions, see Lewis, 581 F.3d at 100, and 
ultimately reach the same result under Rule 6. 
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ld] focus on whether a new evidentiary hearing 
would be meaningful, in that a new hearing would have the 
if the petitioner satisfies this first criterion, the court “may 
decline to convene an evidentiary hearing if the factual 
allegations are ‘contravened by the existing record.’”15  
Palmer, 592 F.3d at 393 (quoting Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474); 
see also Morris v. Beard, --- F.3d ---, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
1551, at *28 (3d Cir. Jan. 26, 2011) (“‘[I]f the record refutes 
the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes 
habeas relief,’ no evidentiary hearing is required.” (quoting 
Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474)).  Moreover, we have stressed that 
“courts [shou
potential to advance the petitioner’s claim.”  Campbell, 209 
F.3d at 287. 
 The District Court held that an evidentiary hearing 
would not advance Williams’ Batson inquiry.  Williams was 
afforded a full and complete hearing in the PCRA court.  He 
was provided with the trial court’s voir dire notes, as well as a 
document summarizing the motivation for each of the 
Commonwealth’s peremptory strikes.  The prosecutor 
appeared for several hours of testimony, almost all of which 
                                                 
15  “Under § 2254(e)(2), ‘a habeas court is barred from holding an 
evidentiary hearing unless the petitioner was diligent in his attempt 
to develop a factual basis for his claim in the state court.’”  Morris 
v. Beard, --- F.3d ---, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1551, at *19 (3d Cir. 
Jan. 26, 2011) (quoting Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 
(3d Cir. 2010)).  Williams diligently pursued—and obtained—an 
evidentiary hearing in the PCRA court, during which his Batson 
claim was explored in detail.  He is therefore not barred from 
seeking an evidentiary hearing in federal court. 
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“[n]o additional, relevant 
information would be gained from a federal hearing that 
cannot be ane e agree.  
See Morris, --- F.3d ---, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1551, at *29–
0 (exp
 
plain—and both parties agree—that Williams 
objected after the Commonwealth used its second peremptory 
centered upon her voir dire strategy and state of mind.  She 
proffered an explanation for each of her challenges and 
supported most of these explanations by reference to the 
record.  The racial composition of the venire and jury was 
clearly established.  In short, the PCRA proceeding was 
comprehensive.  Williams identifies no potential facts which 
a second evidentiary hearing is likely to unearth.  The District 
Court quite accurately observed that 
gle d from the state court record.”  W
3 laining that an evidentiary hearing is warranted only if 
there are “critical issues of material fact” that remain 
unresolved).  The District Court’s rejection of Williams’ 
discovery requests will be affirmed. 
2 Application of the Uderra Rule 
 On collateral appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
determined that Williams waived his Batson claim because, 
as a matter of fact, “trial counsel did not raise a Batson 
objection during voir dire.”  Williams II, 863 A.2d at 514. 
This was an unreasonable determination of facts in light of 
the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.  The trial 
record is 
challenge to dismiss an African American venireperson.  
Williams objected a second time after Foulkes exercised her 
fourth strike.  Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s fact-
finding is clearly contradicted by the record.  As a result of its 
mistake of fact, the Court did not address the Batson claim on 
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of the evidence.  Uderra, 
862 A.2d at 86–87.  In Williams’ case, the Pennsylvania 
its merits. 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did, however, 
indirectly address the Batson claim through its ineffective 
assistance inquiry.  Specifically, Williams argued that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to insist that the 
Commonwealth provide race-neutral reasons for its 
challenges, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
neglecting to raise a Batson challenge on direct appeal.  To 
assess the ineffective assistance claims, the Supreme Court 
queried whether Williams’ underlying Batson challenge was 
meritorious.  It ultimately answered in the negative after 
applying its then-recent precedent, Commonwealth v. Uderra, 
862 A.2d 74 (Pa. 2004).  Uderra held that when a post-
conviction petitioner fails to raise an adequate Batson 
challenge at trial, he or she is not entitled to rely upon 
Batson’s burden-shifting framework in a collateral attack; 
rather, the petitioner must prove actual, purposeful 
discrimination by a preponderance 
Supreme Court held that the evidence did not meet the 
threshold mandated by Uderra.  The court thus determined 
that the underlying Batson challenge lacked merit and, 
accordingly, rejected both ineffective assistance claims.  
Williams II, 863 A.2d at 514–15.  Neither ineffective 
assistance claim is before us today. 
 The Commonwealth argues that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s application of the Uderra rule is reasonable 
and must therefore guide our inquiry into the merits of 
Williams’ Batson challenge.  In other words, the 
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ourt’s waiver holding is premised on an 
unreasonable determination of facts, namely: the faulty 
finding that William aile n objection during 
voir dire.  Given these circumstances, we need not assess the 
pprop
preclusive effect.  See Thomas, 570 F.3d at 115.  Thus, for 
Commonwealth argues that we should not apply the three-
step Batson framework, but should instead simply ask 
whether Williams proved racial discrimination by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  We disagree.  As explained 
above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that 
Williams waived his Batson claim; thus, it did not apply 
Uderra to the claim.  In fact, it did not address the claim at 
all.  See Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(critiquing contention that a state court implicitly addresses 
the merits of a claim when it rules on a derivative ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim).  What is more, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme C
s f d to raise a Batso
a riateness of the Uderra rule, nor will we express an 
opinion on whether it represents an unreasonable application 
of Batson.  We now turn to the merits of this equal protection 
challenge. 
3 Batson Merits 
 The PCRA court denied Williams’ Batson claim on the 
merits: it held that there was insufficient evidence from which 
to infer that the Commonwealth exercised its peremptory 
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.  As noted 
above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address this 
substantive determination, but instead resolved Williams’ 
Batson claim on procedural grounds.  The Supreme Court’s 
procedural resolution is the only decision entitled to 
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ia state courts have not 
adjudicated the Batson claim on the merits.  See id. at 114–
                                                
purposes of AEDPA, the Pennsylvan
15; see also Lewis, 581 F.3d at 100 (explaining that when a 
state court’s final resolution of a claim is based on procedural 
grounds, that claim has not been “adjudicated on the merits” 
for purposes of § 2254(d)).  No AEDPA deference is due by 
this Court.16  Lewis, 581 F.3d at 100. 
 A Batson challenge presents a mixed question of law 
and fact on federal habeas review.  Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 
254; Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 719 (3d Cir. 2004).  
When AEDPA deference does not apply, we review a mixed 
 
16  The District Court incorrectly afforded AEDPA deference to the 
PCRA court’s substantive resolution of the Batson claim.  The 
District Court concluded that, although the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court did not adjudicate the claim on the merits, the state courts—
in this case, the PCRA court—had resolved the claim on 
substantive grounds, and thus there was an “adjudication on the 
merits” under § 2254(d).  An “adjudication on the merits” can, of 
course, occur at any level of the state courts.  See Thomas v. Horn, 
570 F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  When the state supreme court 
finally resolves a claim on procedural grounds, however, the 
substantive determination of a lower state court is stripped of its 
preclusive effect.  Id.  A substantive determination that lacks 
preclusive effect is not an “adjudication on the merits.”  Id. at 114 
(explaining that an “adjudication on the merits” is “a decision 
finally resolving the parties’ claims, with res judicata effect, that is 
based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a 
procedural, or other, ground” (quoting Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 
303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001))).  As a result, the PCRA court’s Batson 
ruling was not an “adjudication on the merits.” 
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must articulate race-
neutral justifications for her strikes.  Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 
328 (c
Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272, 288 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96).  That said, we 
question of law and fact de novo.  Lewis, 581 F.3d at 100.  
However, any of the state courts’ pure factual determinations, 
whether explicit or implicit, retain the presumption of 
correctness mandated by AEDPA.  See id.; see also § 
2254(e)(1); Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Batson announced a three-step burden-shifting 
framework for judges to employ in order to determine 
whether racial discrimination is at work in jury selection.  
That procedure, which we have set forth above, requires a 
defendant to make out a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination before the prosecutor 
iting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98).  After the parties have 
satisfied their respective burdens of production in these first 
two steps, the defendant must prove purposeful 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.  See id. at 
328–29 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98). 
Establishment of a prima facie case requires the 
defendant to show that “the totality of the relevant facts gives 
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”  Johnson v. 
California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) (quoting Batson, 476 
U.S. at 93–94).  This step is not intended to be particularly 
onerous, and “the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact . . . 
that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice 
that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to 
discriminate.”  
have emphasized that “peremptory strikes are presumptively 
valid” and “need not be supported by any reason” so long as 
they are not “exercised on an unconstitutional basis, such as 
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of those were used to 
remove African American members of the venire.  Thus, the 
                                                
race or gender.”  United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 505 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
 The Supreme Court has identified at least two 
examples of circumstances relevant to step one’s totality 
inquiry.  First, the defendant may proffer evidence that the 
government exercised a “‘pattern’ of strikes against black 
jurors included in the particular venire, [which] might [then] 
give rise to an inference of discrimination.”  Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 97.  Second, “the prosecutor’s questions and statements 
during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges 
may support or refute an inference of discriminatory 
purpose.”17  Id.  In the instant matter, the venire was 39% 
African American.  The Commonwealth exercised a total of 
sixteen peremptory challenges; fourteen 
prosecutor struck African Americans at a rate of 87.5%, but 
struck white venirepersons at a rate of 12.5%.  The District 
Court called this pattern “stark” and held that these statistics 
alone were sufficient to make out a prima facie case.  That 
ruling is consistent with our precedents. 
 Statistical evidence may be sufficient by itself to make 
out a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  See, e.g., 
 
17  Jurisprudence in this circuit has “identified several additional 
relevant factors, including how many members of the cognizable 
racial group are in the venire panel; the nature of the crime; and the 
race of the defendant and the victim.”  Lewis, 581 F.3d at 103 
(internal quotations omitted). 
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rima facie showing in Brinson v. Vaughn, where 
the Commonwealth used thirteen of its fourteen strikes to 
remov
the record does 
not illuminate the composition of the venire, there may be 
Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 971 (3d Cir. 1993); Overton v. 
Newton, 295 F.3d 270, 278 & n.9 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing cases 
and stating “statistics, alone and without more, can, in 
appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to establish the 
requisite prima facie showing under Batson”).  In Holloway v. 
Horn, we had “little difficulty” finding a prima facie case 
when the prosecutor used eleven of twelve strikes to remove 
African American venirepersons.  355 F.3d at 722.  Similarly, 
we found a p
e African Americans.  398 F.3d 225, 234–35 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Additionally, our decision in Hardcastle v. Horn 
strongly implies that a prosecutor who removes twelve of 
fourteen African American venire members exhibits a pattern 
of strikes sufficient to raise an improper inference.  See 368 
F.3d at 256. 
In each of these decisions, however, we were unable to 
fully reconstruct the racial composition of the venire.  
Reconstruction of the venire often provides crucial context to 
a prosecutor’s strike rate.  See Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at 291–
92.  For example, a strike rate of 90% looks less stark when 
the venire is 90% African American.  When 
insufficient evidence with which to mount a successful 
collateral attack.  Indeed, we rejected the petitioner’s 
challenge in Abu-Jamal when he established that ten of the 
prosecutor’s fifteen peremptory strikes were used to remove 
African Americans, but was unable to reconstruct the 
composition of the venire.  See id. at 291–92. 
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 rate also 
exceeded 85%; consistent with Holloway, Brinson, and 
Hardc
  Bond, 539 F.3d at 270.  In this case, Foulkes 
accepted five of the nineteen African Americans she had the 
opport
 What is telling about Holloway, Brinson, and 
Hardcastle—in contrast to Abu-Jamal—is that the pattern of 
strikes in these cases was sufficient to satisfy the prima facie 
threshold even without evidence of the venire’s racial 
makeup.  In each case, the strike rate exceeded 85%, whereas 
the rate in Abu-Jamal was 66.7%.  Here, the strike
astle, we find that evidence of the strike rate alone 
satisfies Williams’ prima facie showing.  After all, the 
Commonwealth exercised fourteen of its sixteen peremptory 
challenges on African Americans.  In a venire that was less 
than 40% black, it is hardly a leap to conclude that a strike 
rate of 87.5% raises an inference of discrimination. 
Although the strike rate data is sufficient by itself to 
make a prima facie showing in this case, we need not rely 
exclusively on the Commonwealth’s strike rate.  Evidence 
contrasting the rate at which the prosecution accepts black 
and white jurors may also raise an inference of 
discrimination.  In Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 
2008), the prosecutor accepted between 41% and 47% of the 
black venirepersons that he had the opportunity to strike; his 
acceptance rate for white members of the venire was 83%.  
We held that the disparity between these acceptance rates was 
sufficient to make out a prima facie case at step one of the 
Batson analysis.
unity to strike.  Her acceptance rate was thus 26.3%.  
By contrast, she accepted nineteen of the twenty-one white 
venirepersons she had the opportunity to strike.  Her 
acceptance rate for white venire members was therefore 90%.  
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and conclude that the proffered 
reasons, some of which are discussed in more detail below, 
are fa
Under Bond, this disparity raises an inference of 
discrimination. 
In sum, Williams has proffered statistical evidence 
sufficient to suggest that the Commonwealth’s peremptory 
challenges were based upon an improper motive.  We must 
therefore proceed to step two and three of the Batson inquiry.  
The government’s burden of production at step two is 
“relatively low,” Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 257; “[u]nless a 
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s 
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral,” 
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam) 
(quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)).  
At the PCRA hearing, Foulkes provided an explanation for 
each of her strikes.  Williams does not contend that any of 
Foulkes’ reasons were facially illegitimate.  Nonetheless, we 
have reviewed the record 
cially race-neutral.  The burden therefore rests upon 
Williams to prove that the explanations offered by Foulkes 
are not persuasive and are instead pretextual.  See Miller-El, 
537 U.S. at 338–39 (stating that step three of the Batson 
framework centers upon “the persuasiveness of the 
prosecutor’s justification”). 
At step three of the Batson analysis, the petitioner 
must show that “it is more likely than not that the prosecutor 
struck at least one juror because of race.”  Bond, 539 F.3d at 
264.  To determine whether the petitioner has carried his or 
her burden, the court must evaluate “all evidence introduced 
by each side (including all evidence introduced in the first 
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y involves an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility, 
and the best evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be 
the dem
and second steps) that tends to show that race was or was not 
the real reason” for each strike.  Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 259 
(quoting Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) (en 
banc)); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 
(2008) (explaining that “all of the circumstances that bear 
upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted”).  Step 
three ultimately focuses upon the prosecutor’s subjective 
motivation, which ideally includes an assessment of the 
demeanor and credibility of the various voir dire participants.  
See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (“Step three of the Batson 
inquir
eanor of the attorney who exercises the challenges.” 
(alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)).  To the extent that such assessments factor into the 
court’s final ruling, they must be accorded significant 
deference on appeal.  See id. at 477; DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 
507. 
As we have stated, the PCRA court made no step-three 
findings.  The parties nonetheless developed a significant 
record at the PCRA hearing and, while this is a very 
imperfect substitute for a trial judge’s findings of fact, it 
permits sufficient—though hardly ideal—collateral review.  
In the District Court, Williams proceeded by method of 
comparing stricken members of the venire to individuals the 
Commonwealth deemed acceptable.  We have previously 
authorized such an evaluative procedure, explaining, “A 
comparison between a stricken black juror and a sitting white 
juror is relevant to determining whether the prosecution’s 
asserted justification for striking the black juror is pretextual.”  
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(2005) 
(finding Batson violation based in part on juror comparison).  
n ex
 be absolutely certain, sure that 
this person really deserves that.”  After the prosecutor 
 although it would 
not be “easy,” she “did not think” she would have any 
Riley, 277 F.3d at 282; Holloway, 355 F.3d at 724; see also 
Snyder, 552 U.S. at 479–86 (performing comparative 
analysis); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241–52 
A planation that appears race neutral at step two may 
betray an improper motive if it is invoked to strike African 
Americans but not other non-black venirepersons exhibiting 
the same characteristic.  Williams focuses upon five stricken 
members of the venire, all of whom were African American.  
We will confine our comparative inquiry accordingly. 
 Lucille Dozier.  Ms. Dozier was asked whether she 
had any beliefs which would prevent her “from being able to 
impose the death penalty in an appropriate case.”  She 
answered, “I would have to
rephrased the question, Dozier stated that she could impose 
the death penalty if appropriate.  At the PCRA hearing, 
Foulkes testified that she struck Dozier on the basis of her 
initial hesitancy.  Foulkes explained, “[I]t appeared to me 
from her answers [that it would be] very difficult for her to 
apply the law in this case.” 
 Williams names two comparators, both of whom were 
white: Debra Pagano, seated as juror number seven, and 
Virginia Feo, who was accepted by the Commonwealth but 
stricken by the defense.  When Foulkes asked Pagano 
whether she would have any difficulty imposing the death 
penalty in an appropriate case, Pagano answered, “No.”  Feo 
was posed the same question and stated that
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was approximately the same age as 
Williams and, in her opinion, he exhibited a “hostile affect.”  
 to credit prosecutor’s justification that stricken 
venireperson was excessively nervous when the state court 
difficulty imposing a penalty of death.  Neither of these 
comparators expressed a sentiment close to that exhibited by 
Dozier; specifically, neither Pagano nor Feo required 
“absolute certainty” in order to recommend the death penalty.  
The comparative evidence thus fails to suggest that Foulkes’ 
reason for striking Ms. Dozier was pretext. 
 Shawn Kimble.  Mr. Kimble was employed as a 
purchasing agent, graduated from Central High School in 
west Philadelphia, and studied business at Drexel University.  
Foulkes observed that he 
Foulkes testified that she struck Kimble due to concerns about 
his attitude, his age, and because Williams asked Kimble no 
questions during voir dire.  Furthermore, Foulkes explained 
that none of these factors alone moved her to exercise a 
challenge; rather, it was the combination of concerns that 
together led to the strike. 
 Because the PCRA court resolved the Batson claim at 
step one, it did not assess Foulkes’ reasons for striking 
Kimble and, consequently, made no finding with respect to 
Kimble’s alleged hostility.  We cannot presume that the 
PCRA court credited Foulkes’ assertion that Kimble 
displayed a hostile affect.  See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 479 
(declining
did not make an on-the-record determination regarding 
venireperson’s demeanor).  As a result, we will not consider 
the prosecutor’s demeanor-based reason for striking Kimble 
and will instead focus upon Foulkes’ remaining justifications: 
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he focus 
in step three is to uncover a prosecutor’s subjective 
ried mother of five 
living in southwest Philadelphia.  During voir dire, Foulkes 
age and the defendant’s decision not to question Kimble on 
voir dire. 
 Williams attacks these rationales by proffering two 
comparators to whom Williams posed no questions during 
voir dire, and who were nonetheless accepted by the 
Commonwealth.  These two individuals—Isabelle Edmonson 
and Robert Eberle—do not constitute true comparators for 
purposes of our inquiry.  Although Williams did not ask any 
questions of either Edmonson or Eberle, both were 
significantly older than the defendant.  Therefore, neither can 
be said to exhibit the same characteristics as Kimble (age and 
lack of questioning).  In a comparison analysis, it is 
insufficient to proffer venire members who lack one or more 
of the characteristics upon which the prosecutor exercised a 
strike.  This is not to erect an unreasonable roadblock; rather, 
it ensures accuracy in an area often guided by guesswork and 
hunches.  See DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 505 (explaining that a 
peremptory challenge “is usually based on educated guesses 
about probabilities based on the limited information available 
to an attorney about prospective jurors”).  Because t
motivation, it is imperative to account for the complete 
combination of factors that caused the prosecutor to exercise 
a strike.  Here, it was Kimble’s proximity to the defendant’s 
age and the fact that defense counsel asked him no questions.  
Williams identifies no comparators that meet these criteria; 
therefore, his comparative evidence is unpersuasive. 
 Geraldine Hill.  Ms. Hill was a mar
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asked cause 
of the ity of 
the jur   Hill 
replied, “Either way I believe, no one, and I mean no one[,] 
would ulkes 
explain
nt to challenge 
her for cause, but the emphasis that she gave 
Williams contends that Hill subsequently clarified her 
Hill, “would you surrender your belief merely be
fact that other members of the jury, even a major
y, would believe contrary to what you believe?”
change my mind.”  At the PCRA hearing, Fo
ed her dismissal of Hill as follows: 
I have to say I can almost remember her saying 
this, I know that’s rather remarkable, but she 
said that no one would change her mind if she 
came to a certain conclusion in the jury.  Again, 
the way she put it, the language that she used, 
was such that it was not sufficie
that response indicated to me that if she came to 
a conclusion, that she was not someone who 
was responsive to deliberating further with her 
fellow jurors.  And again, this is something that 
is a matter of affect and emphasis in the tone of 
how she delivered her answers. 
response, and that Foulkes’ concerns were thus unreasonable.  
In particular, Foulkes later asked Hill, “So when you say that 
you make up your mind and that’s it, that doesn’t mean that 
you wouldn’t be able to deliberate with your fellow jurors?”  
Hill answered, “No.  You will have to show me where I am 
wrong, either way.  As long as I can be shown.” 
 There is no question that as a result of Hill’s 
clarification, she could not be stricken for cause.  However, 
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ehavior, see DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 505.  A 
prosecutor—indeed, any trial advocate—has every reason to 
 they would require the Commonwealth to 
prove Williams’ guilt “beyond all doubt.”  Both answered 
Yes.”
                                                
Foulkes’ lingering concern was not unreasonable.  Hill’s 
initial assertion that “no one, and I mean no one[,] would 
change my mind” is emphatic and suggests that she may have 
difficulty deliberating with other jurors.  This is not to say 
that she would, in fact, have had difficulty participating in 
deliberations; but a peremptory strike is often no more than a 
guess about future b
hedge against empaneling an individual who might prove 
unduly obstinate.  What is more, Williams proffers no 
comparators for Hill, rendering our post-hoc comparative 
evaluation of little use.  Given the guesswork inherent in the 
jury selection process, Hill’s removal does not suggest 
improper motives. 
 Lillie Moore & Dwayne Kitchen.  Ms. Moore was 
married, worked as a keypunch operator, and lived in the 
Logan section of Philadelphia.  Mr. Kitchen was twenty-two, 
resided in north Philadelphia, and was employed as a 
construction worker.  Foulkes asked both of these venire 
members whether
“ 18  After the prosecutor posed the question to Kitchen, 
the court interjected: “I don’t think that’s an appropriate 
question, and I think that you ought to not ask it anymore.”  It 
is undisputed that Foulkes posed a question to several African 
American and white jurors that used similar “beyond all 
 
18  Subsequent clarifications by both Moore and Kitchen prevented 
each from being stricken for cause. 
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ons concerning 
reasonable doubt, then [wouldn’t they] be available to be 
doubt” phrasing. 
 At the PCRA hearing, Foulkes testified that she struck 
Moore and Kitchen because it appeared to her that both 
individuals would “require[] proof beyond all doubt in a 
serious matter like this.”  The court pressed Foulkes on her 
explanation, asking, “[I]f a juror adhered to the fact that they 
couldn’t follow the Court’s instructi
challenged for cause?”  Foulkes indicated that although 
Moore and Kitchen were rehabilitated to the court’s 
satisfaction, she believed both “were trying very hard to 
satisfy the Court in their answers, that in their heart [they] 
really simply couldn’t hold the government to a different 
standard than [certainty beyond all doubt].” 
 By way of comparison, Williams proffers juror 
number 176, Gloria Mastronardo.  Foulkes did not ask 
Mastronardo a question using the “beyond all doubt” 
phrasing; however, Williams argues that Mastronardo’s 
opinions regarding the death penalty are comparable to those 
Foulkes attributed to Moore and Kitchen.  The record does 
not support such a contention.  If anything, Mastronardo 
expressed views that were somewhat more receptive to 
imposition of the death penalty.  When asked whether she had 
any beliefs that might prevent her from recommending death, 
she stated, “I used to think I would never be against capital 
punishment but perhaps—it would depend on the nature of 
the crime, to be honest” (emphasis added).  Foulkes later 
asked if Mastronardo was capable of “impos[ing] the death 
penalty.”  She answered, “I believe so.”  In short, 
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e reservations that Moore 
and Kitchen expressed.  Furthermore, while Foulkes posed an 
eld that 
at step three, an acceptance rate of 41-47% (compared to 83% 
r wh
Mastronardo articulated none of th
improperly phrased question to both Moore and Kitchen, she 
posed similar questions to several other individuals of each 
race.  Williams cannot point to any venireperson who 
answered the “beyond all doubt” question like Moore and 
Kitchen, yet who Foulkes failed to strike.  We thus find no 
value in the comparative evidence. 
 Although Williams’ juror-by-juror comparison 
evidence falls short, we are mindful that we must consider the 
totality of the available evidence, including that which was 
proffered at steps one and two of the Batson inquiry.  See 
Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 259.  Here, Williams presents fairly 
strong strike-rate evidence: the prosecutor exercised fourteen 
of sixteen strikes to remove African Americans from a venire 
that was 39% black.  The rate at which she struck African 
Americans was 87.5%, compared to a strike rate of 12.5% for 
white venire members.  There are also less revealing 
statistics.  The Commonwealth accepted black venire 
members at a rate of 26.3%.  In Bond v. Beard, we h
fo ites) was “reasonably high,” and was evidence that the 
prosecutor was not racially motivated.  539 F.3d at 270.  
While the acceptance rate in Williams’ case is not equivalent 
to Bond’s, it is much higher than the 9% rate criticized by the 
Supreme Court in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 240–41.  
We find the acceptance rate data inconclusive at best. 
 The statistical data is but one portion of the totality 
that we must consider at step three.  Williams was tried by a 
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importantly, she was consistent in the application of her 
reasons; she did not, for example, accept white venire 
jury of five African Americans and seven white individuals.  
Both defendant and victim were African American and there 
was no racial component to the crime.  See Lewis, 581 F.3d at 
103 (explaining that the race of the defendant and victim, and 
the nature of the crime, may be relevant circumstances to 
consider); Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at 288 n.16 (same).  These 
facts cut in the Commonwealth’s favor.  Furthermore, 
Williams’ comparative evidence was exceedingly weak.  
Foulkes provided plausible reasons for each of her strikes, 
and supported her reasons by recourse to the record.  More 
members who articulated a refusal to deliberate or who would 
require proof beyond all doubt to return a verdict of guilt.  On 
the totality of the record before us, the evidence offered by 
Williams is simply insufficient to overcome the evidence that 
favors the Commonwealth.19  Accordingly, Williams’ Batson 
                                                 
19  Williams makes passing reference to the infamous Jack 
McMahon training videotape, created in 1987 and featuring former 
Philadelphia Assistant District Attorney Jack McMahon.  In the 
tape, which was intended as an educational tool for young 
prosecutors in the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, 
McMahon makes several comments suggesting that he made 
conscious efforts to strike qualified African Americans from the 
venire.  See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 656–58 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(recounting in detail several of McMahon’s more inflammatory 
comments).  Since its public disclosure in 1997, many defendants 
have sought to bolster a Batson claim by recourse to the tape.  See, 
e.g., Lewis, 581 F.3d at 104; Wilson, 426 F.3d at 653; Brinson v. 
Vaughn, 398 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2005).  In Lewis, we found the tape 
to be of little significance where the petitioner was unable to show 
that the district attorney responsible for his prosecution had seen 
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challenge fails on its merits. 
B Accomplice Liability Instructions 
 Williams’ second claim sounds in due process: he 
contends that the trial court’s accomplice liability instructions 
permitted the jury to find that he was an accomplice to first 
degree murder without finding that he possessed the specific 
intent to kill.  Intent to kill is an element of first degree 
murder under Pennsylvania law.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(a).  
This element must be proved whether the defendant is the 
principal or merely an accomplice to the homicide.  Everett v. 
Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 513 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
“since the legislature drafted the law on first-degree murder, 
Pennsylvania law has clearly required that for an accomplice 
to be found guilty of first-degree murder, s/he must have 
intended that the victim be killed” (internal citations 
omitted)).  If, as Williams argues, the charge allowed the jury 
to find that he was an accomplice to first degree murder 
without finding that he possessed the mens rea required for 
that offense, then the instructions were constitutionally 
infirm, for due process requires that each element of the 
                                                                                                             
the tape or followed its recommendations.  See 581 F.3d at 104.  
Similarly here, Williams cannot argue that Foulkes viewed the 
tape, for it was created at least one year after Williams’ trial.  
There is no evidence that Foulkes was aware of McMahon-like 
practices which pre-dated the tape’s creation or that she utilized 
such practices in any of her trials, let alone the Norwood murder 
trial.  Thus, we find the tape to be of no significance in the instant 
matter. 
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ir. 1997) (holding that petitioner 
stated a due process claim when he successfully argued that 
 
petition filed in 2005.  The PCRA court dismissed this 
petitio
ot firmly established and regularly applied at 
the time the default occurred.  The Court proceeded to the 
charged offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also Smith v. Horn, 
120 F.3d 400, 410 (3d C
the trial court’s jury instructions “had the effect of relieving 
the Commonwealth of its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt one of the elements of first-degree murder 
under Pennsylvania law”). 
 Williams did not object to the accomplice liability 
instructions at trial, nor did he question this aspect of the 
charge in post-trial motions to set aside the verdict.  He also 
did not raise the issue on direct appeal or in his PCRA 
petition.  It was not until November 2001, when the collateral 
proceeding was pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, that Williams filed a motion to remand to the PCRA 
court so that he might challenge the accomplice liability 
instructions.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied this 
motion.  Williams raised the issue again in a second PCRA
n as untimely.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545 (requiring 
any PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent 
petition, to be filed within one year of the date that judgment 
becomes final).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. 
Williams then petitioned the District Court for habeas 
relief.  The District Court held that Williams’ claim was not 
time-barred because the PCRA’s one-year statute of 
limitations was n
merits and rejected Williams’ accomplice liability claim.  It 
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concluded that even if the charge contained constitutional 
error, it was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence 
adduced at trial. 
 We begin by considering whether Williams 
procedurally defaulted his accomplice liability claim.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the claim was untimely under 
state law and may not be reviewed by this Court.  A federal 
habeas court cannot review a claim rejected by the state 
courts “‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law 
ground that is independent of the federal question and 
adequate to support the judgment.’”  Beard v. Kindler, --- 
U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 612, 614 (2009) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)).  
State procedural rules, such as the PCRA’s statute of 
limitations, are not an adequate bar to federal habeas review 
unless they were “‘firmly established and regularly 
followed’” at the time the rule was contravened.  Wilson v. 
Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Bronshtein 
v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 2005)).  Williams ran 
afoul of the PCRA’s statute of limitations when he failed to 
raise the accomplice liability claim in his initial petition for 
PCRA relief in 1996.  See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 
A.2d 1091, 1093 n.2 (Pa. 2010).  This default occurred well 
before October 20, 1998, the date by which the PCRA statute 
of limitations was firmly established and regularly followed.  
See Morris, --- F.3d ---, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1551, at *12–
13 (explaining that prior to October 20, 1998, Pennsylvania 
courts “refused to enforce procedural rules—such as the 
PCRA’s one-year statute of limitations—in capital cases”); 
Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 707–09 (same).  Because the 
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e state courts dismissed 
Williams’ accomplice liability claim was not firmly 
 a tire iron and socket wrench with which to 
bludgeon Norwood’s skull.  Williams implored Draper to join 
blood stains on Williams’ shoes.  Before they parted ways on 
procedural rule under which th
established and regularly followed at the time of his default, it 
is an inadequate bar to federal habeas review.  We will 
therefore proceed to the merits and consider the claim de 
novo.  See Lewis, 581 F.3d at 100. 
 The propriety of the court’s charge is closely 
intertwined with the evidence and argument brought forth at 
trial.  Williams was tried alone.  The Commonwealth argued 
that Williams and Draper perpetrated the killing together.  
Williams was portrayed as the principal.  According to 
Draper, Williams hatched the plan to rob Norwood and 
recruited Draper to assist.  Once the robbery was complete, it 
was Williams who decided to kill Norwood.  To that end, he 
retrieved
him in this endeavor, and the two beat Norwood until he was 
bloody and lifeless.  Simply put, Draper’s account left no 
ambiguity regarding Williams’ role as the principal in the 
offense. 
 This account was consistent with testimony supplied 
by other Commonwealth witnesses.  Williams was seen 
driving Norwood’s vehicle approximately one hour after the 
murder occurred.  He told his friend Rucker that he “offed a 
guy” named Amos earlier that evening.  Rucker observed 
the night of the murder, Williams told Rucker that he was 
“going to get some gas from a gas station to go back to the 
scene of the crime.”  Police officers later discovered 
 56 
 
 their criminal endeavor, 
and then exited the vehicle when they refused.  Williams 
laime
Norwood’s body in the cemetery, charred beyond recognition. 
 The Commonwealth’s narrative sharply conflicted 
with Williams’ account.  He claimed that on the day of the 
murder, he had seen Norwood, Draper, and an acquaintance 
named Michael Hopkins riding in Norwood’s blue Chrysler 
LeBaron.  They apparently pulled up alongside Williams, and 
Draper indicated that they were headed to Draper’s mother’s 
residence on Roumfort Road.  Williams asked for a ride 
because he happened to be going to a party in the same 
vicinity.  When the foursome neared the cemetery, Draper 
and Hopkins—but not Williams—allegedly assaulted 
Norwood.  Williams stated that he was unaware that his 
friends intended Norwood any harm.  But when they initiated 
the assault, Williams allegedly became agitated, demanded 
that Draper and Hopkins abandon
c d that he then walked to the residence of an 
acquaintance and borrowed bus fare to return home.  As 
Williams told it, he was not part of the robbery and was not 
present when Norwood was killed. 
 The jury was thus presented with a stark choice: either 
Williams was the principal in a first degree murder or he was 
ignorant of his friends’ plans and nowhere near the cemetery 
when the killing occurred.  Neither party argued that 
Williams was an accomplice to robbery or murder.  Rather, 
both the prosecutor and defense counsel stressed their 
contrasting narratives.  Foulkes was blunt: she called 
Williams “a person who commits atrocious, murderous, 
malicious acts and then spends the rest of his days lying, 
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by 
contrast, urged the jury to adopt Williams’ version of events 
t’s 
decision to provide an accomplice liability charge is rather 
curiou  the 
elemen ying 
mens bery, 
and cri t, 
You may find a defendant guilty of a crime 
sonally present 
when the crime was committed. 
                                                
covering up, . . . trying to make things seem as they’re not.”  
And she emphasized, over and over again, that Williams was 
a murderer who intended to kill.  Defense counsel, 
and attempted to demonize Draper as a liar.  Several times he 
succinctly summarized the all-or-nothing proposition facing 
the jury: “If you believe Mr. Williams, you will acquit him of 
all charges.”  Accomplice liability was simply not in play. 
 In light of these conflicting accounts, the trial cour
s.20  Nevertheless, after charging the jury on
ts of various degrees of murder (and accompan
rea requirements), voluntary manslaughter, rob
minal conspiracy, the court stated, in pertinent par
without finding that he personally engaged in 
the conduct required for commission of that 
crime or even that he was per
An accomplice is one who either plans, 
cooperates, assist[s], counsels or otherwise aids 
in the perpetration of the crime. 
A defendant is guilty of a crime if he is an 
 
20  During oral argument before the District Court, the parties were 
asked why the accomplice liability instruction was given.  Neither 
could provide an answer. 
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with the intent of promotion or 
facilitating commission of the crime, he solicits, 
te or facilitate the 
commission of the crime, and wholly deprives 
the defendant guilty of a crime on 
the theory that he was an accomplice as long as 
n accomplice to first 
degree murder without finding that he possessed the specific 
accomplice of a person who commits that 
crime.  The defendant does not become an 
accomplice merely by being present at the scene 
or knowing about the crime.  He is an 
accomplice if, 
commands, encourages or requests the other 
person to commit it or aids, or agrees to aid or 
attempts to aid the other person in planning or 
committing it. 
However, a defendant is not an accomplice if 
before the other person commits the crime, he 
stops his own efforts to promo
his previous efforts of effectiveness or gives 
timely warning to the law enforcement authority 
or otherwise makes a proper effort to prevent 
the commission of the crime. 
You may find 
you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the crime was committed, and that the 
defendant was an accomplice of the person who 
committed it. 
Williams argues that this instruction “unconstitutionally 
broadened the scope of accomplice liability” because it 
permitted the jury to find that he was a
 59 
 
ther words, the inquiry 
requires careful consideration of each trial’s unique facts, the 
intent to kill.  If the theory of accomplice liability were a 
viable one in this case, Williams might have a point.  But it is 
not.  Accordingly, the trial court’s charge reveals no 
deficiency of constitutional dimension. 
 To show that a jury instruction violates due process, a 
habeas petitioner must demonstrate both (1) that the 
instruction contained “some ‘ambiguity, inconsistency, or 
deficiency,’” and (2) that there was “‘a reasonable likelihood’ 
that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the 
State of its burden of proving every element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 
U.S. 179, 129 S. Ct. 823, 831 (2009) (quoting Middleton v. 
McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) and Estelle v. McGuire, 
502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)).  Satisfaction of this two-part inquiry 
requires a federal habeas court to “focus initially on the 
specific language challenged,” Smith, 120 F.3d at 411 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and then to 
review the challenged instruction in the context of the entire 
charge and in light of the evidence and arguments presented 
at trial.  Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (“[T]he instruction ‘may not 
be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the 
context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” 
(quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973))); 
Waddington, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S. Ct. at 833 (analyzing 
accomplice liability charge in light of parties’ closing 
arguments).  In this fashion, a due process analysis depends 
as much on the language of the court’s charge as it does on 
the particularities of a given case.  In o
narratives presented by the parties, the arguments counsel 
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murder.  There simply was no viable third option.  The charge 
as a whole reflected this stark choice.  The court mentioned 
                                              
delivered to the jurors before they retired to deliberate, and 
the charge as a whole.  See Waddington, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S. 
Ct. at 831–33; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. 
 Here, even if the trial court’s accomplice liability 
charge was in some respect ambiguous, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a manner 
that relieved the Commonwealth of its burden of proof with 
respect to first degree murder.  The trial record makes this 
point plain: all of the evidence and argument indicated either 
that Williams was the principal killer—with the specific 
intent to kill—or that he played no role in the robbery and 
the concept of accomplice liability sparsely.  Its first degree 
murder instructions did not mention the concept of 
accomplice liability at all.21  Instead, the charge (rightly) 
   
21  The  must 
first de nd, if 
he did 
first de
 
If you find the defendant guilty of murder; that is, 
 the first 
egree, murder of the second degree, or murder of 
itted with a specific intent to kill. . . . 
first degree murder instruction explained that the jury
termine whether Williams participated in the murder a
so, whether he acted with a mens rea sufficient to meet the 
gree murder standard: 
an unlawful killing with malice, you must then 
determine whether he is guilty of murder of
d
the third degree. 
 
Murder of the first degree is a criminal homicide 
comm
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focused on Williams’ actions and mental state.  Thus, 
although the court provided instruction on the theory of 
accomplice liability, it appears to have done so out of 
oversight or, perhaps, carelessness.  In either event, the mere 
provision of this stray instruction does not alter the fact that 
accomplice liability was a theory for which there was no 
evidentiary support.  By including the instruction in the final 
charge, the court did not violate Williams’ right to due 
process.22 
 
onsistency between argument and charge 
akes it more likely that the jury understood the requirements of 
Therefore, in order to find the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree, you must find that the 
killing was a willful, deliberate and premeditated 
act. 
 
(emphasis added).  The prosecutor’s closing argument was 
consistent with these instructions.  She repeatedly highlighted 
evidence of Williams’ intent, stating, for example, “That, ladies 
and gentlemen, is murder in the first degree, because . . . his 
actions supply the inference that the defendant intended to take 
life[.] . . . [H]e expressed, by his action, a specific intention, above 
and beyond the robbery, to kill [Norwood], to kill him for the 
purpose whatever, for whatever purpose.”  In a due process 
challenge, a strong c
m
the law and applied those requirements correctly.  Cf. Smith v. 
Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 404–05 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding infirmity 
when prosecutor urged jury to apply erroneous theory of 
accomplice liability). 
 
22  Williams suggests that even if provision of the accomplice 
liability instruction was unnecessary, we must nonetheless 
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 Finally, Williams contends that the trial court’s 
instruction was nearly identical to the accomplice liability 
instruction that we held to be constitutionally deficient in 
Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419 (3d Cir. 2005).  In Laird, co-
defendants Laird and Chester left a bar along with a third 
individual named Milano.  Milano’s body was discovered the 
following evening in a nearby wooded area.  Laird and 
Chester were tried together for, inter alia, murder, 
kidnapping, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and 
conspiracy.  Both took the stand and admitted that they 
participated in the kidnapping and were present for Milano’s 
death.  Id. at 422, 426.  Each denied that he intended for 
Milano to be killed.  Id. at 422.  Laird accused Chester of 
killing Milano and vice versa.  Id. at 422, 426.  The jury 
convicted both defendants of an array of offenses, including 
first degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and 
conspiracy. 
 The trial court in Laird provided an accomplice 
liability instruction that was almost identical to the instruction 
given in Williams’ case, but the similarities between the two 
proceedings essentially end there.  Laird was a two-defendant 
trial wherein both of the accused admitted their participation 
                                                                                                             
acknowledge the fact that the theory was presented to the jury.  As 
such, the jury may have concluded that Williams was an 
accomplice to first degree murder.  On habeas review, we do not 
deal in “may haves.”  The appropriate question is whether the 
outcome proposed by Williams was reasonably likely.  See 
Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S. Ct. 823, 831–32 
(2009).  Our answer to this question is a resounding No. 
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s.”  Id. at 427 (quoting 
Smith, 120 F.3d at 414).  To put it differently, under the Laird 
in some aspect of the crime—i.e., the kidnapping.  See id. at 
426.  Neither co-defendant, however, admitted he was an 
accomplice to the actual homicide.  It was therefore 
imperative for the charge to distinguish between Laird’s 
acknowledged role as an accomplice to kidnapping and his 
disputed role as accomplice to first degree murder.  Yet the 
trial court failed to make such a distinction, and failed to 
explain that an accomplice to kidnapping is not necessarily an 
accomplice to murder.  Given the circumstances present in 
the case, it was incumbent upon the trial court to ensure that 
the jury understood “that an accomplice for one purpose is 
[not] an accomplice for all purpose
charge, the jury reasonably could have concluded that 
because Laird was an accomplice to kidnapping, he must also 
have been an accomplice to murder. 
 The problem in Laird was not the accomplice liability 
instruction’s linguistic imprecision per se.  Rather, the 
instructional ambiguity worked a critical error when viewed 
in the context of the trial record as a whole.  Williams does 
not acknowledge this aspect of the holding.  Instead, he 
argues that the similarity of both instructions demonstrates 
constitutional error.  But as we indicated above, a rote 
comparison of the two instructions is insufficient in a due 
process inquiry.  See Waddington, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S. Ct. at 
831–33; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72.  Although the trial judge in 
Laird provided an accomplice liability instruction that was 
nearly identical to that rendered here, there was a profound 
difference between each proceeding’s evidence, argument, 
and the charges as a whole.  That difference is dispositive.  In 
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d the 
Commonwealth of its burden of proof.  There is no such 
 In sum, we find that the trial court’s accomplice 
liability instruction was not constitutionally infirm.  
                                                
Laird, the ambiguity in the charge, coupled with the balance 
of pertinent considerations, made it reasonably likely that the 
jury applied the instruction in a manner which relieve
likelihood here.  Williams’ testimony—unlike that provided 
by the co-defendants in Laird—attempts to exculpate him 
completely.  Accomplice liability is simply not in play. 
Williams’ arguments to the contrary are without merit.23 
C Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 Williams’ final claim invokes the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective counsel.  Under Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), criminal defendants are entitled to 
effective representation at both the guilt and penalty phases of 
trial.  To establish a constitutional violation under Strickland, 
a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient, and that it prejudiced the defense.  Id. at 687–88.  
Where a Strickland claim is raised on federal habeas review, 
however, the petitioner must not only show deficient 
 
23  Williams also claims that both his trial counsel and his counsel 
on direct appeal were ineffective for neglecting to challenge the 
accomplice liability instruction.  Because this claim lacks merit, 
neither counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue it.  See Premo 
v. Moore, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011); Werts v. Vaughn, 
228 F.3d 178, 203 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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Strickland, or it rested ‘on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
offense, or so the argument goes.   Panarella instead opted to 
performance and prejudice; in addition, he or she must show 
that “the state court’s rejection of [the] claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel was ‘contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of’ 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’”  Porter v. 
McCollum, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2009) (per 
curiam) (quoting § 2254(d)). 
 Williams contends that he received deficient legal 
representation during the trial’s penalty phase.  Specifically, 
he claims that Panarella—his trial counsel—failed to conduct 
a reasonable investigation into his background.  Such an 
inquiry would have revealed extensive evidence of physical 
and sexual abuse, as well as sundry concerns with Williams’ 
mental health.  This evidence, in turn, could have been 
presented to the jury to mitigate the brutality of Williams’ 
24
                                                 
24  Mitigating circumstances are set forth by statute under 
Pennsylvania law.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e).  Had 
Panarella presented the evidence described above, Williams argues 
that the jury could have found either that he “was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” § 
9711(e)(2), or that his “capacity . . . to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law was substantially impaired,” § 9711(e)(3).  Williams also 
contends that the jury could have found that the “catch-all” 
mitigation provision set forth in § 9711(e)(8) was applicable.  See 
§ 9711(e)(8) (“Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the 
character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his 
ffense.”). o
 66 
 
iams’ physically abusive stepfather.  
The jury evidently rejected Panarella’s characterization, for it 
able probability 
the presentation of [prior abuse and mental health] evidence 
                                                                                                            
portray the defendant as a capable young man for whom the 
crime was but an aberration.  He did not present evidence of 
sexual abuse or mental impairment, and there was only a 
passing reference to Will
concluded that there were no circumstances that mitigated the 
severity of the offense.25 
 Williams raised this ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim in his petition for PCRA relief.  Prior to ruling on the 
petition, the PCRA court heard several days of testimony.  
Three mental health experts testified that Williams was 
psychologically damaged at the time of the offense.  At least 
eight additional witnesses took the stand and detailed the 
physical and sexual abuse to which Williams was subjected 
throughout his youth.  Finally, Panarella testified concerning 
his performance at trial.  At the conclusion of these 
proceedings, the PCRA court denied the ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim on its merits.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that Williams did not meet “his 
burden of demonstrating there was [a] reason
would have resulted in a life sentence instead of the death 
penalty.”  Williams II, 863 A.2d at 521 n.12. 
 
 
25  Most notably, the jury did not find that Williams’ age was a 
mitigating factor in the offense.  This finding is significant, and we 
address it in more detail below. 
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tandard of review, it could not find that 
Panarella’s performance was prejudicial to the defense.  
Accord
 On federal habeas review, the District Court concluded 
that Panarella’s penalty-phase performance was 
constitutionally deficient.  The Court explained: “Panarella’s 
efforts fell far short of . . . prevailing professional norms, and 
the explanations he provided during post-trial and PCRA 
hearings reflected inattention to the penalty phase rather than 
tactical decision making.”  On step two of the Strickland 
inquiry, however, the Court concluded that under AEDPA’s 
deferential s
ingly, the District Court denied Williams’ claim.  We 
exercise plenary review over this decision.  See Lewis, 581 
F.3d at 100. 
We will not revisit the District Court’s determination 
that Panarella was constitutionally ineffective during the 
trial’s penalty phase.  We instead accept this finding for 
purposes of our present analysis and proceed to the prejudice 
inquiry.  See Wong v. Belmontes, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 383, 
386 (2009) (per curiam) (assuming, for purposes of analysis, 
that counsel’s performance was deficient when prejudice 
inquiry was dispositive).  The Pennsylvania state courts 
resolved Williams’ ineffective assistance claim on the merits; 
our review of the issue is thus governed by principles of 
AEDPA deference.  See Lewis, 581 F.3d at 100.  We apply 
these principles to the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court because it provides “the ‘last reasoned decision’ of the 
state courts” on the Strickland claim.  Simmons, 590 F.3d at 
231–32 (quoting Bond, 539 F.3d at 289–90).  Under § 2254, 
“[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application 
of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.”  Harrington v. 
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 court’s determination 
that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so 
reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s deficient performance, “one juror [would have] 
oted 
Richter, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).  This means 
that a habeas petitioner “must do more than show that he 
would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were being 
analyzed in the first instance”; to prevail, the petitioner must 
demonstrate that the state court “applied Strickland to the 
facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”  Bell 
v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698–99 (2002); see also Harrington --
- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (“A state
long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness 
of the state court’s decision.” (quoting Yarborough v. 
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004))). 
 To establish prejudice, the petitioner “must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  A “reasonable 
probability” is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id.  The Strickland prejudice standard is not 
“stringent”—it is, in fact, “less demanding than the 
preponderance standard.”  Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 154 
(3d Cir. 1999)); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 
22 (2002) (explaining that Strickland “specifically rejected 
the proposition that the defendant had to prove it more likely 
than not that the outcome would have been altered”).  In a 
capital case arising from the Pennsylvania state courts, 
prejudice exists if there is a 
v to impose a sentence of life imprisonment rather than 
the death penalty.”  Bond, 539 F.3d at 285 (citing 42 Pa. 
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able mitigation evidence.”  Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003).  Only then may we ask 
 Accordingly, we begin by reconstructing the record.  
We will then wei  and assess 
whether Panarella’s deficient performance prejudiced the 
Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(iv)). 
 A careful prejudice inquiry requires that we “consider 
all the relevant evidence that the jury would have had before 
it if [counsel] had pursued [a] different path.”  Wong, --- U.S. 
---, 130 S. Ct. at 386.  This includes evidence that was 
adduced at trial as well as that which was not presented until 
postconviction review.  See Porter, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. at 
454.  Stated differently, we must reconstruct the record and 
assess it anew.  In so doing, we cannot merely consider the 
mitigation evidence that went unmentioned in the first 
instance; we must also take account of the anti-mitigation 
evidence that the Commonwealth would have presented to 
rebut the petitioner’s mitigation testimony.  See Wong, --- U.S 
---, 130 S. Ct. at 390 (stating that “the reviewing court must 
consider all the evidence—the good and the bad—when 
evaluating prejudice”).  Once we have reconstructed the 
record, we must “reweigh the evidence in aggravation against 
the totality of avail
whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s ineffectiveness, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different. 
 re gh the totality of the evidence
defense. 
1 Reconstructing the Record 
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illiams was convicted of 
third degree murder, theft by unlawful taking, and possession 
ness testified to 
Williams’ general good nature and athletic success.  In 
 The trial’s penalty phase was a brief affair.  For the 
Commonwealth, assistant district attorney Jeffrey Kolansky 
took the stand and supplied the basic facts regarding the 
Dorfman robbery.  He stated that the incident occurred on 
December 24, 1982; that the victims were Don and Hilda 
Dorfman, aged sixty-nine and sixty-four, respectively; that 
Williams was sixteen years of age at the time of the offense; 
that Williams entered the Dorfmans’ home carrying a .22 
caliber Winchester rifle, pointed it at Mrs. Dorfman and fired 
it three times above Mr. Dorfman’s head; and that Williams 
was convicted of two counts of first degree robbery, one 
count of burglary, one count of simple assault, one count of 
unauthorized use of an automobile, and one count of 
conspiracy.  Next, Philadelphia police detective Lawrence 
Gerrard provided testimony pertaining to the Hamilton 
murder.  He explained that the incident occurred on January 
26, 1984; that Hamilton was stabbed approximately twenty 
times; that the murder weapon was left lodged in the back of 
Hamilton’s neck; that Williams was seventeen years of age at 
the time of the offense; and that W
of an instrument of a crime.  Finally, Philadelphia Quarter 
Sessions court clerk Margie Frazier described the sentences 
imposed for each of these offenses. 
 Williams presented three witnesses: his mother, 
Patricia Kemp; his girlfriend, Marlene Rogers, and his first 
cousin, Willie Dino James.  Each wit
something of an understatement, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court found that this rather generic testimony was “not 
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 her son’s childhood abuse.  She denied 
abusing Williams herself—a point she would contradict ten 
years l tated 
that W o my 
son.”  
 
my son, Mrs. Easton, and I would send him 
es, was 
very abusive to Terry, was very nasty to Terry. 
phone that I paid for. 
emp 
compelling.”  Williams II, 863 A.2d at 520. 
 Kemp did provide limited evidence on cross 
examination regarding
ater at the postconviction proceeding—but she s
illiams’ stepfather, Ernest Kemp, was “abusive t
She continued: 
He [Ernest Kemp] didn’t care about [Williams].  
He accused my son of doing things, having girls 
in the room.  That was a lie. 
My son would be asleep at night, and he 
[Ernest] would be drunk and he would come in 
and bust in the room and say he [Williams] has 
somebody in there, and my son had called my 
job, and I had told Terry to go down to Mom’s.  
That’s a lady on the street that helped me raise
down there with her because my husband 
[Ernest], that I am married to now, y
He pushed Terry down a flight of steps because 
Terry was on the 
K was not asked to elaborate on these statements on 
redirect examination and no additional abuse testimony was 
elicited by either party. 
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t he 
inflicted upon them.”  According to the Commonwealth, 
William
 spare Mr. Williams’ 
life.  I can say to you that justice is always tempered with 
mercy 
 In her closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized 
Williams’ prior convictions and his predilection for violence.  
She underscored that Williams “has taken two lives, two 
innocent lives of persons who were older and perhaps unable 
certainly to defend themselves against the violence tha
s was a violent individual whose behavior would 
have continued escalating had he not been apprehended. 
Panarella’s closing focused on his client’s youth.  He 
stressed the fact that Williams was only four months past his 
eighteenth birthday at the time he committed the offense and 
he explicitly asked the jury to find that age was a 
circumstance that mitigated Williams’ culpability for the 
crime.  Additionally, Panarella argued that Williams’ life 
sentence would be one of extreme hardship; Williams would 
be deprived of the privileges of fatherhood, and he would be 
exposed to “all of the brutalities that are associated with 
prison life.”  Panarella concluded by appealing to the jury’s 
sense of justice.  He stated, “I ask you to
but let me say to you that inflicting the death sentence 
in this case, I believe, is inappropriate.” 
The jury rejected this plea.  It determined that two 
aggravating circumstances were applicable: (1) the murder 
occurred during the commission of a felony (robbery), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(6), and (2) Williams had a significant 
history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of 
violence, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(9).  It also found that 
Williams was not entitled to any of the statutory mitigating 
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1(e), 
including the provision that accounts for a defendant’s age at 
the tim
 beat her son, often in public when she 
would retrieve him from school.  Villareal said that Kemp 
basis by her mother.  Kemp enlisted Williams’ assistance in 
circumstances set forth in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 971
e of the offense, § 9711(e)(4).  The jury then weighed 
the aggravating factors and returned a sentence of death. 
At the PCRA hearing approximately twelve years 
later, a very different picture of Williams emerged.  No fewer 
than eight witnesses came forward to describe a childhood 
plagued by frequent physical and sexual abuse.  Kemp 
testified (in direct contradiction to her penalty phase 
testimony) that she “would beat Terry very often because he 
was smart mouthed.”  When Williams was in the sixth grade, 
Kemp met her son at school, publicly “beat him like 
Muhammad Ali,” and then threw him down a flight of stairs.  
One of Williams’ teachers, James Villareal, confirmed that 
Kemp frequently
would hit her son “in a fierce way” and typically for no 
apparent reason. 
 Kemp was not the only source of Williams’ physical 
abuse.  His brother Thomas, some ten years Williams’ senior, 
testified that he physically “disciplined” his younger sibling.  
He once threw Williams down a flight of stairs and, on a 
separate occasion, attempted to shoot him with a rifle.  
Williams’ older sister, Theresa, was also beaten on a routine 
this endeavor; on more than one occasion, Williams was told 
to hold his sister while Kemp beat her with an electrical cord. 
 Williams was approximately ten years old when Kemp 
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e fought with Williams.  In order 
to escape this environment, it was not uncommon for 
ams was approximately 
fifteen, he was attacked by an older male while staying in a 
                                                
married Ernest Young.  Several witnesses described Young as 
a “drunk” who became physically violent in the throes of 
intoxication.  Kemp said that her husband was “very cruel, 
very nasty,” and that he often “tr[ied] to fight my children.”  
Young typically directed his anger toward his wife; when she 
was not around, however, h
Williams to flee the home and stay with neighbors, 
sometimes for days on end. 
 There was also sexual abuse.  When Williams was 
very young, perhaps around the age of six, he was sodomized 
by a neighbor boy five years his senior.  In his early teens, he 
was repeatedly molested by a teacher.  At thirteen, Williams 
met and began a relationship with Norwood.  Norwood was 
cruel and physically abusive at times; he once allegedly beat 
Williams with a belt.  When Willi
boys’ home.  The assailant held a weapon to Williams’ neck 
and forced him to perform fellatio.26 
 Three mental health experts testified on Williams’ 
behalf.  First, Dr. Julie Kessel, a forensic psychiatrist, 
 
26  The Commonwealth assails these allegations of sexual abuse by 
pointing out that not one of the purported incidents was 
contemporaneously reported to medical or law enforcement 
officials.  In fact, all of the sexual abuse testimony is based upon 
statements provided in anticipation of the PCRA hearing.  As such, 
the Commonwealth’s point is well taken and we factor it into our 
prejudice analysis accordingly. 
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hen he killed Norwood, and that he 
was substantially impaired in his capacity to appreciate the 
e mental or emotional disturbance, and that at the time 
of the offense, he was unable to appreciate the criminality of 
explained that she conducted a mental health evaluation 
during a four-hour interview with Williams in 1998.  She 
diagnosed Williams with an array of chronic impairments: 
major depression with periods of recurrent psychosis and 
paranoia; post-traumatic stress disorder; polysubstance abuse; 
and borderline personality disorder.  According to Dr. Kessel, 
each of these conditions was present in 1984.  She therefore 
opined that Williams was suffering from extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance w
criminality of his conduct and to conform his actions to the 
requirements of the law. 
 The second mental health expert presented by the 
defense was Dr. Patricia Fleming, a clinical psychologist who 
interviewed Williams in 1996 for a period of seven hours and 
administered a battery of psychological tests.  Dr. Fleming 
explained that Williams was “mentally ill”—among other 
afflictions, he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder 
and was extremely passive-aggressive.  Williams’ personality 
was marked by its impulsivity; Dr. Fleming repeatedly 
described him as “rageful” and testified that Williams “tended 
to keep his anger repressed until it exploded.”  In the year 
before he murdered Norwood, Williams’ “behavior was out 
of control” and getting worse.  This rage was accompanied by 
a “high level of paranoia,” depressive symptoms, suicidal 
ideation, and sleep disorder.  In sum, Dr. Fleming was of the 
opinion that Williams killed Norwood under the influence of 
extrem
his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
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mental or emotional 
disturbance when he killed Norwood.  Dr. Kaufman could not 
law. 
 The final mental health expert for the defense was Dr. 
Ralph Kaufman, a clinical psychiatrist.  Dr. Kaufman 
interviewed Williams on three separate occasions in 1996 for 
approximately ten hours in total.  Dr. Kaufman echoed the 
findings of Drs. Kessel and Fleming: he stated that Williams 
exhibited symptoms of depression, suicidal ideation, anxiety, 
hypervigilance, identity difficulties, and psychotic 
decompensation.  Furthermore, Williams suffered from post-
traumatic stress disorder and was prone to impulsivity.  As a 
result of these afflictions, Dr. Kaufman opined that Williams 
was under the influence of extreme 
say, however, whether Williams was unable to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law. 
 These three defense experts were generally consistent 
in tracing the origins of Williams’ mental impairment.  All 
identified recurrent childhood abuse—especially sexual 
abuse—as a principal cause of Williams’ later psychological 
disorders.  There was unanimous agreement that the assault at 
the boys’ home was a “major” or “acute” trauma, one which 
contributed significantly to the onset of post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  Dr. Fleming testified that it caused Williams to 
suffer a “psychological breakdown.”  He began to self-
mutilate and to fantasize about suicide.  He also started to 
experience nightmares in which he was sexually assaulted by 
older men wielding dangerous weapons.  Williams developed 
an intense anger toward males who “he felt were [sexually] 
interested in him, whether they made advances or not.”  Dr. 
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as intense rage towards 
male homosexuals.”  Dr. Fleming called the boys’ home 
sault
they therefore constitute 
important anti-mitigation evidence.  We must consider such 
Kessel summarized the end result of this abuse: “Every act of 
sexual behavior with a man would further sort of humiliate 
him personally and would increase his rage, which he 
described had been increasing.  He h
as  “a true break.”  Afterwards, Williams “couldn’t 
control himself” or contain his anger. 
 Not every mental health professional agreed with the 
opinions set forth above.  In fact, Williams was subjected to 
several psychiatric evaluations contemporaneous with his 
crime spree in the mid-1980s; these evaluators uniformly 
concluded that Williams was mentally competent and, while 
perhaps somewhat maladjusted, he was not cognitively 
impaired.  Had these evaluations been presented at the trial’s 
penalty phase—in rebuttal to mitigation testimony offered by 
Williams—they surely would have bolstered the 
Commonwealth’s depiction of a mentally competent, 
calculated murderer.  This is not to say that the conclusions in 
these reports were unassailable.  However, the reports dilute 
the strength of the mental health characterization proffered by 
Williams at the PCRA hearing, and 
evidence as part and parcel of the prejudice inquiry.  See 
Wong, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. at 390. 
 On February 27, 1985, Williams was examined by Dr. 
Edwin Camiel.  At the time, then-nineteen-year-old Williams 
had been incarcerated for eight months on charges that he 
murdered Norwood.  Williams was “obviously anxious and 
his behavior was characterized by agitation and hand 
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dant and 
the clinical picture is consistent with a diagnosis of a 
impairment is consistent with a diagnosis of schizophreniform 
[w]ringing.”  Williams told Dr. Camiel, “I can’t cope with 
this.”  He reported a sensation of pressure throughout his 
body.  Dr. Camiel recorded several clinical observations.  He 
stated that Williams “appeared to be developing a paranoid 
delusional system”; that he could “detect no gross 
abnormalities in [Williams’] cognitive functioning”; and that 
Williams’ “[j]udgment making capacity appeared to be 
somewhat impaired and his responses to social judgment 
questions indicated a tendency to respond impulsively to a 
stressful situation in a self-centered manner without regard to 
the consequences of his behavior for others.”  In Dr. Camiel’s 
opinion, Williams’ condition revealed “evidence of a 
developing Psychotic Disorder of a paranoid type. . . . This is 
the first evidence of psychiatric illness in this Defen
Schizophreniform Disorder or a briefly active psychosis 
secondary to the stress of his present incarceration.” 
 Dr. Camiel’s evaluation is notable because it observed 
the early stages of Williams’ psychological difficulties and 
attributed their onset to circumstances subsequent to 
Norwood’s murder.  The report stated that Williams is 
developing a psychotic disorder.  It portrays this turn of 
events as “the first evidence of psychiatric illness in this 
Defendant.”  Dr. Camiel explained that this developing 
disorder, which by its very nature connotes a short-term 
ailment lasting from one to six months.27  This time frame is 
                                                 
27  Williams’ experts acknowledged as much.  Dr. Kessel stated 
that “schizophreniform psychosis [refers to] overt symptoms 
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important, for it suggests that the disorder described by Dr. 
Camiel did not manifest itself until after Williams killed 
Norwood.  Furthermore, it indicates that eight months after 
the murder, Dr. Camiel detected no permanent abnormalities 
in Williams’ cognitive function.  According to Dr. Camiel, 
Williams’ newfound psychological complications were 
secondary to “the stress of his present incarceration.”28  Dr. 
Camiel therefore recommended immediate psychiatric 
treatment “in order to prevent the progression of symptoms to 
the development of a full blown psychotic disorder.” 
 In spite of the apparent discord between the Camiel 
report and the mental health narrative offered by the defense, 
Drs. Kessel and Fleming testified that Dr. Camiel’s findings 
were consistent with the opinion that Williams was severely 
mentally impaired when he committed the crime.29  Dr. 
 
lasting under six months. . . . If it is longer than six months, we 
nd to call it schizophrenia.”  Dr. Fleming agreed, explaining that 
  Dr. Camiel examined Williams two days after he was convicted 
ctors agreed 
at Williams’ psychological difficulties were caused by stress 
te
to be diagnosed with schizophreniform disorder, “the symptoms 
have to have lasted from one month to six months.” 
 
28
of third degree murder for the Hamilton killing.  It was also 
Williams’ nineteenth birthday. 
 
29  Drs. Kessel, Fleming, and Kaufman each criticized aspects of 
Dr. Camiel’s report as well.  Dr. Fleming stated that Dr. Camiel 
“didn’t have the luxury . . . of having a lot of background 
information.”  Dr. Kessel testified that Dr. Camiel’s report was 
“not particularly in depth.”  None of the defense do
th
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ication for a long-
suffering victim of psychological disorder. 
d concluded that he was 
certifiable to stand trial as an adult. 
Kessel explained, “The kind of paranoia he’s demonstrating 
[in the Camiel Report] and the anxiety level and his agitation 
would certainly be consistent with a post-traumatic stress 
disorder [patient] who has also got an underlying tendency to 
become psychotic.”  In Dr. Kessel’s view the appearance of 
the symptoms was simply the latest compl
 But Dr. Camiel was not the only professional to find 
Williams mentally competent around the time of the offense.  
On January 14, 1983, Dr. Anthony Zanni examined Williams 
in anticipation of his certification hearing for the Dorfman 
robbery.  Williams was sixteen years of age.  Dr. Zanni stated 
that Williams’ “contact with reality was good”; he “has never 
had persecutory delusions”; and he “has never had visual or 
auditory hallucinations.”  In addition, Williams’ “[i]nsight 
and judgment are not impaired.”  Dr. Zanni diagnosed 
Williams with conduct disorder an
 Williams was examined again on March 14, 1984 by 
Dr. Melvin S. Heller.  He was eighteen.  According to Dr. 
Heller, Williams “show[ed] no evidence of mental 
impairment” and was “[w]ithout psychosis.”  Williams 
exhibited “no signs of psychotic thought disorder, delusions, 
hallucinations, inappropriate affect, inadequate attention span 
or bizarre behavior.”  Moreover, there was “no indication that 
                                                                                                             
related to incarceration.  According to Dr. Fleming, the symptoms 
were too serious to be caused by incarcerative stress. 
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able.”  Three months after Dr. Heller’s evaluation, 
Williams murdered Norwood.  He had killed Hamilton just 
o m
ture.”  Marlene 
Rogers and Lucille Rogers (mother of Marlene and 
ertainly never 
mentioned a single instance of sexual abuse.  What is more, 
[Williams was] operating under any undue mental or 
emotional stress,” and Dr. Heller indicated that Williams’ 
“prospects for community adjustment would appear to be 
most favor
tw onths prior.  Thus, the Heller report captured Williams 
in the midst of his crime spree.  Its contents are difficult to 
reconcile with the testimony of Drs. Kessel, Fleming, and 
Kaufman. 
 One additional category of anti-mitigation evidence 
bears consideration: during Williams’ certification proceeding 
in January 1984, approximately ten to fifteen witnesses—
Williams’ family and friends—provided testimony portraying 
Williams’ home life as stable, loving, and supportive.  
Williams was, for example, engaged in “honest” pursuits; he 
was a football star with pending scholarship offers; he was a 
“bright young man” with a “wonderful fu
grandmother of Williams’ child), echoed this theme in 1984.  
Both returned for the PCRA hearing in 1998 and changed 
their tune, characterizing Williams’ home life as a “terrible 
situation” permeated by “abusive behavior.” 
 There was additional evidence, contemporaneously 
provided, suggesting that Williams’ home life was not as 
nightmarish as that which he depicted on collateral review.  
Williams’ mother repeatedly told probation officers that her 
relationship with her son was “satisfactory.”  At trial, she 
flatly denied inflicting any abuse.  She c
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r 
attacking the credibility of those who depicted Williams’ life 
of near-consta abu gion, thereby 
diluting the effectiveness of the proffered mitigation 
Williams himself echoed these sentiments, telling at least one 
probation officer that “he had a happy childhood,” and was 
“inspired” by his family, neighbors, and coaches.  Williams 
never provided contrary testimony under oath. 
 To acknowledge testimony portraying Williams’ 
upbringing in a positive light is not to reject the PCRA 
narrative of lifelong physical and sexual abuse.  However, the 
parade of witnesses who testified at the certification 
proceeding described Williams’ home life very differently 
than those who appeared at the PCRA hearing.  Similarly, the 
testimony provided by Williams’ mother could scarcely have 
been more contradictory.  For purposes of our prejudice 
inquiry, it is the fact of inconsistency that is important.  If 
nothing else, the Commonwealth could have used the 
certification testimony to considerable advantage by 
impeaching the PCRA narrative.  The opportunities fo
nt se would have been le
evidence.  Our consideration of the reconstituted record 
simply cannot ignore such pointed anti-mitigation evidence. 
2 Assessing the Evidence 
 In order to show prejudice, Williams must establish 
that there is a reasonable probability that but for Panarella’s 
deficient performance, “one juror would have voted for life 
imprisonment rather than the death penalty.”  Bond, 539 F.3d 
at 289.  Even if he successfully makes such a showing, 
however, Williams must then demonstrate that the 
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rdle is no simple undertaking; as the 
Supreme Court has recently stressed, the “standards created 
 Stri
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s contrary holding was 
unreasonable.  See Harrington, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. at 786 
(stating that “even a strong case for relief does not mean the 
state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable”).  
Overcoming this hu
by ckland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and 
when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.”  Id. at 
788 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 
1411, 1420 (2009)). 
 In reviewing Williams’ mitigation evidence, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Panarella’s failure to 
present this information at the penalty phase did not prejudice 
Williams’ defense.30  On federal habeas review, the District 
                                                 
30  Williams argues that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
unreasonably applied Strickland because it “articulated an 
incorrect prejudice standard.”  He is wrong.  The Court’s opinion 
twice sets forth its prejudice standard: in the first instance, the 
Court states that a petitioner cannot prevail on an ineffective 
assistance claim “where there is no showing that [mitigating] 
testimony . . . would have been beneficial in terms of altering the 
outcome of the penalty phase hearing,” Commonwealth v. Williams 
(Williams II), 863 A.2d 505, 519 (Pa. 2004) (internal quotation 
omitted); in the second instance, the Court concluded that 
“appellant has not met his burden of demonstrating there was [a] 
reasonable probability the presentation of this evidence would have 
resulted in a life sentence instead of the death penalty,” id. at 521 
n.12.  Both articulations are reasonable under Strickland; the latter 
parrots language of the decision itself.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).  Nonetheless, Williams 
fixates upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s lone reference to a 
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Court concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.  
We agree. 
 The mitigation evidence elicited by Williams on 
collateral review is no doubt sympathetic.  It portrays a much 
more complicated and troubled individual than the one 
depicted during the trial’s penalty phase.  But the evidence is 
not unequivocally mitigating.  Some of the evidence is even 
contradictory.  Had Williams offered Drs. Kessel, Fleming, 
                                                                                                             
petitioner’s “heavy” burden when attempting to establish 
prejudice.  See Williams II, 863 A.2d at 519 (“Appellant has not 
met this heavy burden.”).  Williams argues that by using such a 
descriptor, the Court actually imposed a burden much more 
stringent than the “reasonable probability” requirement set forth in 
Strickland.  We cannot agree.  Although the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s choice of words was imprecise, there is no indication that 
the Court in fact held Williams to an incorrect prejudice standard.  
It twice articulated a standard consistent with Strickland, and it is 
clear from the Court’s opinion that it did not consider the 
mitigation evidence to be the least bit persuasive.  We find that by 
describing Williams’ burden as “heavy,” the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court was merely recognizing the difficulty of prevailing 
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  To accept the 
contrary argument is to disobey “§ 2254(d)’s highly deferential 
standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that 
state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”  Woodford 
v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  Such “readiness to attribute error is inconsistent 
with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law,” 
id., and we accordingly reject it. 
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5 (3d Cir. 2009), where evidence that the 
petitioner was mentally ill at the time of the offense was clear 
and Kaufman at the penalty phase, the Commonwealth could 
have countered with an abundance of evidence suggesting 
that Williams was not mentally ill and that he did not suffer 
psychological impairment.  After all, Williams was examined 
by at least three professionals in and around the time of 
Norwood’s murder; not one thought him seriously mentally 
impaired.  Dr. Zanni stated that Williams’ “[i]nsight and 
judgment are not impaired”; Dr. Heller reported that Williams 
“show[ed] no evidence of mental impairment” and was 
“[w]ithout psychosis.”  According to Dr. Camiel, Williams’ 
symptoms of psychosis were recent and they appeared after 
Norwood was murdered and Williams was incarcerated.  Not 
one of these doctors thought Williams was suffering from 
psychosis on or around the time of the offense; indeed, the 
record is devoid of contemporaneous evidence of 
psychological impairment.  This final point is critical, for it 
distinguishes the instant matter from decisions such Thomas 
v. Horn, 570 F.3d 10
and undisputed.  See id. at 126 (stating that “the 
Commonwealth does not dispute that even the most cursory 
search would have yielded evidence of Thomas’ long history 
of mental illness”). 
 The conflicting nature of the mental health testimony 
is, in fact, reminiscent of our recent decision in Lewis v. 
Horn, 581 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2009).  There, we found that 
evidence purporting to show that petitioner was mentally ill 
and brain damaged was “in large part contradictory.”  Id. at 
112.  Evaluations conducted contemporaneous to petitioner’s 
crime revealed a mentally competent young man, while those 
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ontradictory nature of the evidence undercut 
the effectiveness of Lewis’ mitigation testimony, and 
performed in anticipation of the PCRA proceeding portrayed 
an individual riddled with psychological difficulty.  Id. at 
112–13.  The c
precluded us from overturning the state courts’ determination 
that Lewis was mentally competent at the time of the offense.  
Williams’ mental health evidence is similarly undercut in the 
instant matter. 
 Furthermore, even the testimony offered by Williams’ 
mental health experts was not uniformly sympathetic.  Drs. 
Kessel and Fleming spoke of Williams’ inner “rage,” 
especially with respect to “males who behaved sexually 
toward him.”  Dr. Fleming explained that Williams 
suppressed this rage “until it exploded.”  She described him 
as extremely impulsive, and opined that Williams gave “less 
consideration to the consequences of his actions than a 
normal person would.”  Dr. Kaufman echoed this sentiment, 
testifying that Williams redirected his inner pain onto others 
“without regard to the consequences.”  Such evidence is not 
necessarily mitigating, even if all three doctors rationalized 
this conduct by linking it to Williams’ post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  Their explanation was obviously insufficient for the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which found that the mitigating 
evidence offered by Drs. Kessel, Fleming, and Kaufman was 
neutralized by Williams’ predilection to “direct[] his hurt 
onto other people and . . . to respond to stressful situations in 
a manner without regard to the consequences.”  Williams II, 
863 A.2d at 520 (quoting PCRA decision and adopting its 
findings).  The Court therefore rejected the collective opinion 
that Williams was acting under extreme mental disturbance at 
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he offense and that his capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform it to the requirements 
abuse in or around the time of the murder.  Williams’ only 
the time of t
of the law was substantially impaired.  Given the conflicting 
evidence of psychological damage, we cannot say that this 
finding was an unreasonable determination of facts under § 
2254(d)(2). 
 The testimony concerning Williams’ home life is also 
in tension with itself.  On the one hand, several witnesses 
appeared at the PCRA hearing to describe years of physical 
beatings and sexual molestation.  Their narrative was one of 
serious, long-term abuse.  On the other hand, ten to fifteen 
witnesses took the stand at Williams’ certification proceeding 
and provided a much different characterization.  According to 
this account, provided six months prior to the Norwood 
murder, Williams’ family and friends were loving, 
supportive, stable, and certainly not abusive.  Some of this 
anti-mitigation evidence was offered by the very witnesses 
who later described Williams’ home life in a negative light.  
Williams himself described his upbringing in positive terms.  
He told Dr. Heller (three months before he murdered 
Norwood) that “his family relationships are close and 
meaningful.”  He never acknowledged any physical or sexual 
statements to the contrary were elicited ten years after his 
conviction, in preparation for PCRA review.  The 
contradictory nature of the abuse testimony seriously dilutes 
its mitigating effect.31  See Lewis, 581 F.3d at 112–13 
                                                 
31  Williams suggests that we should overlook the contradictory 
nature of the abuse testimony.  In support of this assertion, he cites 
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(remarking that petitioner never acknowledged physical abuse 
and suggesting that his failure to do so was anti-mitigation 
evidence). 
 In addition to the evidence set forth above, we cannot 
lose sight of the aggravating factors present in this case, 
which were significant and afforded considerable weight by 
the state court.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court highlighted 
the manner in which Williams “planned and carried out the 
killing, as well as his subsequent attempts to cover up the 
murder by burning the body.”  Williams II, 863 A.2d at 520.  
On top of this, Williams “had a significant history of violent 
felony convictions,” id. at 521 n.12; “this was not his first 
                                                                                                             
to our recent decision in Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 
2008).  His citation is inapposite.  In Bond, the petitioner offered 
evidence during the PCRA proceeding that depicted “an extremely 
where there was general testimony of childhood difficulty but not 
troubled and deprived childhood.”  Id. at 280.  Such evidence 
differed significantly from that offered at the petitioner’s trial, 
of anywhere near the magnitude described during postconviction 
proceedings.  See id. at 279–81.  We found that the mitigation 
evidence offered during collateral review was highly persuasive 
and its omission from trial was prejudicial.  In Bond, however, we 
explained that the evidence of childhood abuse and neglect “would 
not contradict earlier testimony, but rather provide details not 
uncovered by trial counsel at the penalty phase hearing.”  Id. at 
291.  This is not the case in the present matter; the testimony of 
Williams’ childhood abuse contradicts that set forth at the 
certification hearing and provided by his mother at the trial’s 
penalty phase.  As such, the mitigating effect of the evidence is 
seriously undercut. 
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unctional family in which he suffered continual 
psychological abuse.”  Id. at 26 (internal quotations omitted).  
This yriad 
psycho The 
state s ding 
that  
the course of a preplanned armed 
robbery) coupled with the aggravating evidence 
murder,” id.  For the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the brutal 
facts of the murder, combined with Williams’ criminal 
history, strongly counseled against a finding of prejudice.   
 In Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002), the 
United States Supreme Court considered a petition that was in 
some respects similar to that presented in the instant matter.  
Visciotti shot and murdered one victim and seriously maimed 
a second before he was arrested and later convicted of first 
degree murder.  On collateral review in the state courts, 
Visciotti argued that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the trial’s penalty phase because his attorney 
failed to present evidence that Visciotti grew up in a 
“dysf
troubled past, in turn, purportedly led to m
logical difficulties in Visciotti’s adult life.  Id.  
upreme court rejected Visciotti’s petition, conclu
the circumstances of the crime (a cold-blooded 
execution-style killing of one victim and 
attempted execution-style killing of another, 
both during 
of prior offenses (the knifing of one man, and 
the stabbing of a pregnant woman as she lay in 
bed trying to protect her unborn baby) was 
devastating. 
Id. (describing state supreme court decision).  These 
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 of violent felony 
convictions.  By downplaying the weight of the aggravating 
aggravating factors were so severe, the state supreme court 
concluded, that they completely overwhelmed the evidence 
proffered in mitigation.  Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to 
present the mitigating evidence in the first instance was not 
prejudicial.  Id.  On federal habeas review, the Ninth Circuit 
granted the writ, but the Supreme Court reversed.  According 
to the Supreme Court, AEDPA endows the state courts with 
primary responsibility for weighing aggravating and 
mitigating factors in a prejudice inquiry.  Id. at 27.  
Furthermore, it was not objectively unreasonable for the state 
supreme court to attribute significant weight to the 
aggravating circumstances in a situation such as this—the 
crime was particularly heinous and, more importantly, 
Visciotti had a pronounced history
factors, the Ninth Circuit had inappropriately substituted its 
own judgment for that of the state supreme court.  Id. at 26–
27.  Woodford makes clear that such second-guessing is 
unwarranted on federal habeas review. 
 Woodford’s reasoning is particularly apt here.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Williams’ brutal 
crimes and record of violent convictions overwhelmed the 
evidence proffered in mitigation.  The Court took especial 
note that “this was not [Williams’] first murder conviction,” 
Williams II, 863 A.2d at 521 n.12, and it specifically adopted 
the reasoning of the PCRA court, which found that the 
aggravating evidence “outweighed” the mitigating testimony 
offered by Williams’ mental health experts, see id. at 520.  In 
other words, the state supreme court concluded that given the 
nature of the aggravating circumstances, Williams could not 
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ntence instead of the death 
penalty.”  Id. at 521 n.12.  In light of the totality of the 
at 
characteristics which reflect the defendant’s “moral 
meet “his burden of demonstrating there was a reasonable 
probability [that] the presentation of [mitigating] evidence 
would have resulted in a life se
reconstituted record—the nature of the offense and Williams’ 
history as a convicted murderer, as well as the equivocal 
nature of the mitigation evidence—we cannot say that this 
determination was unreasonable. 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision is further 
bolstered by the fact that the jury did not find Williams’ youth 
to be a circumstance that mitigated the severity of the offense.  
If ever a capital defendant qualified for the mitigating 
circumstance set forth in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(4), 
Terrance Williams did.  He was four months past his 
eighteenth birthday.  According to Williams’ brief, he is one 
of the youngest men ever placed on Pennsylvania’s death 
row.  Williams’ trial counsel built his closing argument 
around his client’s youth and begged the jury to find that age 
was a mitigating factor.  But to no avail.  The jury’s rejection 
of this mitigation argument is telling; it strongly suggests that 
the jurors’ collective evaluation of Williams’ character would 
have led them to reject other, less clear-cut mitigating 
evidence.  See, e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535 (indicating th
culpability” are relevant at the penalty phase); see also 
Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 310 (explaining that at the penalty phase, 
jury appraises defendant’s “moral culpability”).  This is but 
another factor that points away from a finding of prejudice. 
 In sum, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that 
 92 
 
nflicting mental health evaluations, 
contradictory depictions of Williams’ home life, and 
unequivocal evidence regardi he brutality of the crime and 
Williams’ history of violent offense conduct.  Strickland was 
oday we 
affirm that judgment for the reasons set forth above.  In so 
doing, we are mindful of the gravity of our decision. We are 
bound, however, to respect the lawful decisions of the state 
courts.  Thus, twenty-five years after the jury returned its 
verdict, we deny Williams’ request for habeas relief. 
Williams was not prejudiced by Panarella’s failure to present 
the mitigating evidence set forth in postconviction 
proceedings.  This determination was not an unreasonable 
application of Strickland.  In reaching our conclusion, we are 
mindful of the Supreme Court’s recent admonition that “even 
a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s 
contrary conclusion was unreasonable.”  Harrington, --- U.S. 
---, 131 S. Ct. at 786.  That “‘fairminded jurists could 
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” is, 
by itself, a sufficient basis for rejecting federal habeas relief.  
Id. (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664).  The reconstituted 
record consists of co
ng t
not unreasonably applied on this record.  Habeas relief is 
therefore unwarranted. 
IV 
 In 1986, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Terrance 
Williams of first degree murder and recommended a sentence 
of death.  Williams’ conviction was upheld by the state courts 
on direct appeal, and his attempts to obtain collateral relief 
were likewise unavailing.  On federal habeas review, the 
District Court denied Williams’ petition for relief.  T
